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Abstract 
Service platforms make software applications available as a service to end users. Platforms enable 
noticeable economic benefits for scaling and transforming a business. Their long-term 
competitiveness is ensured in controlled cooperation with channel intermediaries and network 
partners. Hence, service platforms must be designed to harness self-enforcing effects of value 
generation, so-called network effects. In an exaptation of existing knowledge, we present an 
information systems design theory to inform the design of methods that analyze, describe, and guide 
the design of service platforms through the means of causal loops and control methods. We describe 
the theory’s purpose and scope as well as the underlying justificatory knowledge behind the 
constructs and principles of form and function. The design theory covers the design of all service 
platform participants and activities as well as their transactions and influences in areas of staged 
platform authority, using enforcing and incentivizing control methods. We demonstrate the 
principles of implementation with an expository instantiation and apply it to the M-Engineering 
service platform, which offers surveillance, control, and data acquisition solutions. Furthermore, we 
present and discuss testable propositions and a study design to evaluate our design principles. 
Keywords: Information Systems Design Theory, Design Principles, Service Platform Design, 
Network Effects, Control Methods 
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1 Introduction 
The stature and structure of software development and 
distribution have changed dramatically over the past 
decade, as many traditional software products have 
become software services. Rather than being installed 
on-premises, software as a service (SaaS) is internet-
based and runs in the cloud and is thus accessible to 
end users as on-demand services anywhere in the 
world (Mell & Grance, 2011). A service platform is 
software that makes such deployed applications 
available as a service to end users while taking care of 
elasticity, metering, and billing (Barros & Dumas, 
2006; Mell & Grance, 2011; Rimal, Choi & Lumb, 
2009). Service platforms cater to multisided markets, 
help build vibrant ecosystems, and enable others to 
innovate building on the platform-controlled resources 
such as software development kits or application 
programming interfaces (Yoo, Henfridsson & 
Lyytinen, 2010). Technical factors that are often 
associated with and that drive the rapid growth of 
service platforms include shortened deployment times, 
reduced upfront implementation, and minimized long-
term overheads, compared to traditional on-premises 
software (Holt et al., 2011). Examples of contemporary 
service platforms include classic SaaS platforms, such 
as those used by Salesforce and Dropbox as well as 
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LinkedIn or Facebook, and computing platforms such 
as Android or iOS. While we do not explicitly cover 
services such as Airbnb or Uber, this research also 
applies to their service platforms. 
Because of the unprecedented growth of the platform 
business, in mid-2019, the top four public companies 
by market capitalization were, for the third year in a 
row, platform operators offering digital services. 1 
Business models based on platforms allow companies 
to scale external resources and innovation to match the 
soaring needs of customers, while the companies’ 
internal capacities can only be considered as static in 
comparison. In platform-based businesses, third-party 
developers develop applications, services, or systems 
for satisfying end users of the platform, on behalf of 
someone else, namely the platform owner (Ghazawneh 
& Henfridsson, 2013). The platform owner does not 
directly compensate the third-party developer but 
offers a marketplace with greater reach than would 
otherwise be available. By doing so, the platform 
owner taps into multiple networks of developers, 
characterized by heterogeneous innovation capability 
and knowledge resources, and thus can set up a 
revenue-sharing business model in which a specific 
portion of the revenue is withheld as compensation for 
the distribution and support of applications 
(Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013, Yoo et al., 2010). 
Platforms involving third-party service providers 
enable noticeable economic advantages abandoning 
the traditional linear pipeline value chain involving 
gatekeepers (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018, Van 
Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2017). 
Accordingly, the long-term competitiveness of 
services can only be ensured in cooperation with 
channel intermediaries and network partners2 (Vargo 
& Lusch, 2004) with the platform operator in charge of 
a microeconomy (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018). As 
platforms bring together multiple user groups and 
third-party developers, they create so-called network 
effects, or network externalities (de Reuver, Sørensen 
& Basole, 2018). This active participation of 
consumers and external suppliers in the value creation 
process can additionally accelerate a product’s success 
(Chesbrough, 2012; West et al., 2014). Network 
effects are self-enforcing effects of value generation, 
created by causal loops of reciprocal interdependency 
between platform attractiveness and third-party value 
provisioning (Rohlfs, 1974; Shapiro & Varian, 1998). 
However, after opening the platform to third-party 
service provisioning, the platform operators must give 
up control over their service quality to some degree and 
must accept a certain level of self-organization by 
 
1 Global Finance Magazine, https://www.gfmag.com/global-
data/economic-data/largest-companies 
2 A more detailed distinction of roles in service delivery can 
be found, for example, in Barros and Kylau (2011). 
service providers (Lee et al., 2010; Parker, Van 
Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). For example, at first, 
Apple only reluctantly opened the AppStore and thus 
iOS to external developers, giving up some autonomy 
over the platform’s content (Isaacson, 2011). 
Similarly, Salesforce and Dropbox have enabled 
service providers to integrate third-party services into 
their respective platforms. 
To profit from self-organization, however, it is crucial 
that platform operators manage and constrain 
relationships carefully by inciting and exploiting 
network effects to steer the flows of service 
provisioning and consumption effectively (Parker & 
Van Alstyne, 2018). They can do so by using platform 
governance and control mechanisms (Thies, Wessel & 
Benlian, 2018)—i.e., their platform authority. 
Platform authority describes the exercisable degree of 
control and influence a platform operator has over an 
ecosystem participant or activity. Platform operators 
can use multiple control methods to exercise their 
platform authority (Kirsch, 1997; Ouchi, 1979). 
Consider again the example of Apple’s AppStore: 
Apple employees review all apps before they appear 
on the AppStore and the company takes a share of the 
earnings, while at the same time preventing application 
installations outside of the AppStore.3 
The design of a service platform that allows for 
balancing fine-grained degrees of control and 
influence with the freedom to incite network effects, 
appears to be challenging. At this point, few platform 
operators that offer selective cross-industry 
applications have successfully mastered the 
development of a robust and durable service platform 
harnessing network effects (Van Alstyne et al., 2017). 
On the one hand, the platform operator must attribute 
to the members of its ecosystem certain rights to act 
and react in a self-paced way—for example, by 
granting them the right to develop or deploy services 
on the service platform. On the other hand, the 
platform operator must ensure that these services are 
attractive to other participants and comply with 
published terms and conditions as well as the service 
platform’s business model. Coordinating these 
simultaneous interactions is a complex task that is not 
always successful. For example, Google Health4 was a 
personal health record service. Its failure provides an 
insightful example of the platform operator failing to 
incite network effects. Google did not engage with 
doctors as service providers and was not able to partner 
with insurances and, thus, did not provide a base value 
for consumers (patients) to reach self-sustaining levels. 
We still lack theoretical knowledge on how to design 
3 https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/ 
4 https://www.google.com/health (deactivated as of 2013) 
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service platforms for network effects (Abdelkafi et al., 
2018; de Reuver et al., 2018) and how to manage these 
service network effects using one’s own platform 
authority (Ondrus, Gannamaneni & Lyytinen, 2015). 
At the core of this paper is an information systems 
design theory (ISDT) for service network effects, 
which we describe as a “systematic specification of 
design knowledge” (Gregor & Jones, 2007, p. 314). 
The artifact type of our research is a design method for 
service platforms to guide the implementation of 
service platforms for network effects. As network 
effects cannot truly be designed themselves, we 
consider our design principles to be propositions for a 
design method intended to design service platforms in 
such a way that positive networks effects are likely to 
emerge. In doing so, we relate our approach to design 
goal-oriented approaches summarized as design for X 
(Pahl et al., 2007). 
Our ISDT will be helpful in analyzing, explaining, and 
designing for the phenomenon of network effects on 
service platforms by identifying the relevant constructs 
and their relationships and by applying controls 
(Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 2010). Moreover, it will 
help guide the (re)design of service platforms through 
explicit prescriptions. Yet this does not provide a 
ready-to-use design method. Hence, we use this ISDT 
to devise an expository instantiation that assists in 
outlining service platforms, allowing us to plan for the 
desired effects and instantiations of parameters for a 
successful balance between control and self-
organization. 
In the following, we present the purpose and scope of 
our research as well as the methodical framework. 
First, we scope our ISDT and explain the research 
methodology and the process we followed. We then 
detail the underlying kernel theories. Based on these, 
we introduce the necessary constructs, formulate 
eleven distinct design principles, and present our 
design rationale. Further, we describe an expository 
instantiation and its application. Finally, we present 
testable propositions to evaluate our design principles. 
We conclude with a discussion of the implications and 
limitations for research and practice. 
2 Methodical Framework and 
Design Theory 
We follow a design science research process to 
develop our ISDT. As our research progressed, we 
iteratively developed the configuration of the artifacts 
(Baskerville, Pries-Heje & Venable, 2009). We make 
use of kernel theories to derive an ISDT with design 
requirements and a design rationale underlying our 
approach (Simon, 1996; Walls, Widmeyer & El Sawy, 
1992). See Appendix A for a summary of crucial steps 
in the design process. 
2.1 Purpose and Scope of the IS Design 
Theory 
According to Gregor (2006), theories in IS research 
include, among others, theories for design and action. 
They provide prescriptive rather than descriptive 
knowledge to shape the phenomena at hand through 
artificial artifacts. Following Gregor and Jones (2007), 
an ISDT consists of at least the following components: 
a purpose and scope, which explains the design’s 
goals; its constructs encompassing all relevant entities; 
its principles of form and function as an abstract 
blueprint; artifact mutability to assure the theories 
robustness and flexibility; testable propositions for 
evaluation; and justificatory knowledge, which can be 
other theories as well as practical knowledge (Gregor 
& Hevner, 2013). The principles of implementation to 
convey how the artifact can be implemented and 
expository instantiations as a proof of concept are 
optional components. 
The primary artifact of our research is an ISDT to 
inform design methods for service network effects. 
Through explicit methodological prescriptions in the 
form of design principles, this ISDT can be used to 
engineer design methods that describe, analyze, 
explain, and improve network effects using control 
methods on service platforms. Further, we provide 
network effects patterns as selected principles of 
implementation (see Appendix D). An expository 
instantiation of the ISDT in the form of a conceptual 
modeling language provides an illustration of a 
working design method (see Section 5 and Appendix 
C). This language adds the ability to visualize abstract 
theoretical constructs and their relationships 
graphically. 
It must be noted that our ISDT does not explain why 
or if a service platform is or will be commercially 
successful since this depends on other factors such as, 
for example, subsidization, revenue sharing, and 
alliance strategies (Casey & Töyli, 2012; Wanner, 
Bauer & Janiesch, 2019). However, it does assist in the 
analysis of commercialization options by making 
causal loops and network effects visible and explicit. 
Following the knowledge contribution framework of 
Gregor and Hevner (2013), we consider our ISDT to 
be an exaptation of network effects theory and control 
theory to the design of service platforms. It has 
explanatory power and provides design practice theory 
for the design and improvement of further artifacts that 
aim to incite and harness service network effects using 
control methods. We have formulated eleven design 
principles following the suggestion of Chandra, Seidel, 
and Gregor (2015) to include materiality as well as 
action, and we document the underlying design 
rationale. Their general boundary conditions have 
already been covered above; specific limitations are 
mentioned in the detailed description of each principle. 
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2.2 Research Methodology and Design 
Search Process 
The design search process was an iterative process 
involving building artifacts and theories, intervention 
and learning, and enhancement, as described in Meinel 
and Leifer’s (2010) “Design Thinking.” Our process 
aligned with suggestions proposed in Sein et al.’s 
(2011) “Action Design Research” and was similar to 
the approach used by Gregory and Muntermann (2014) 
in their “Heuristic Theorizing.” 
We compiled the first version of our artifacts through 
data elicitation, surveys, and field studies. They 
evolved over a period of five years through a cyclical 
research process within a large research project. The 
continuous application of the method led to 
adaptations and enhancements and resulted in 
redesigns of the approach, a common occurrence in 
design science research (Davison, Martinsons & Kock, 
2004; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2008). Among other 
things, this cyclic research process consisted in an 
analysis of successful service platforms over a period 
of four years, a comparative longitudinal study of 
service intermediaries and field studies on three 
service platforms, as well as an e-market pilot that we 
developed. More details are given in Appendix A. The 
preliminary results have also been presented in prior 
publications (May, Scholten & Fischer, 2011; 
Scholten, 2013; Scholten et al., 2011; Scholten, 
Fischer & Zirpins, 2009; Scholten, Janiesch & 
Rosenkranz, 2013; Scholten, Schuster & Tai, 2012). 
Conducting these tests solely on our own created the 
risk of biased results (Zelkowitz & Wallace, 1997). 
Hence, we enhanced the results through an iterative 
process of discussion and reflection with researchers as 
well as with business analysts and platform architects. 
Our research built on and benefited from these 
continuous exchanges with industry. We conducted 
tests through modeling (intervention/action taking) of 
sample cases to reveal whether all known control 
methods are addressed within our ISDT. We conducted 
an assessment and reflection of the derived ISDT with 
four platform operators (two at intermediate and 
prefinal stages and with two at the end of their 
respective design processes). Furthermore, we 
formulated testable propositions about the design 
principles and proposed evaluating them empirically in 
a survey. In prior publications, we presented an initial 
categorization of control methods (Scholten et al., 
2011; Scholten et al., 2012). 
3 Related Work and Underlying 
Theories 
We draw justificatory knowledge (i.e., kernel theories) 
from different areas, as our ISDT is an exaptation of 
existing theory. Hence, it synthesizes and applies 
theories from several domains. In particular, we based 
our ISDT on the theories of system dynamics, network 
effects, and control theory. 
3.1 System Dynamics and Network 
Effects 
In network theory, the term network effect describes 
the phenomenon that products or services become 
more valuable when large numbers of people use them 
(Rohlfs, 1974; Shapiro & Varian, 1998). Many digital 
goods are subject to network effects. For example, 
once Facebook increased in popularity, Facebook 
accounts became more useful and valuable since they 
could be used to connect to more people. 
A network effect is comparable to reinforcing 
feedback in system dynamics (Forrester, 1961). System 
dynamics describes macroscopic system behavior over 
time, built through the interaction of sources and sinks, 
stocks, flows, and feedback loops, as described in 
systems theory. It is a means to frame, understand, and 
discuss intricate issues and problems in the simulation 
and engineering of complex systems (Dutta, Roy & 
Seetharaman, 2008; Gleich, Mosig & Reinwald, 2011; 
Schneider, Gschwendtner & Matthes, 2015). 
Sources and sinks represent the origin and destination 
of any supply. In system dynamics, they are assumed 
to have infinite capacity, meaning they can never be 
fully depleted or filled. As a source, it causes an inflow 
into a system; as a sink, it is the destination of an 
outflow. Stocks describe the storage capability of a 
system. A stock can accumulate or deplete over time 
and provides a system with memory and inertia. Flows 
change stock over certain periods of time. They can 
behave as inflows, filling the stock, or outflows, 
emptying it. Flows can be positive or negative. 
Feedback loops describe the reciprocity that a stock 
has on its own filling or depletion. These concepts 
describe the elementary constructs of systems designed 
for network effects. 
In the context of service platforms, the provision of 
information about activities on a platform to 
participants who are active on a platform is called 
feedback. The participants’ reaction to this information 
causes reciprocity, meaning modified activity on the 
platform leading to renewed feedback. We refer to the 
feedback loops of auxiliary variables, which are 
functions of stocks and which impact flows as causal 
loops. 
Further, we refer to the value propositions that are 
expected to incite network effects as the base value. 
Base values need to exceed a minimal threshold called 
critical mass. Critical mass theory explores the 
conditions, or the tipping point (Schelling, 1971) under 
which reciprocal behavior begins and becomes self-
sustaining (Oliver, Marwell & Teixeira, 1985). These 
conditions are defined by (1) the relationship between 
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individuals’ contributions of resources and 
achievement of the common good (production 
function), and (2) the heterogeneity of resources and 
interest in the population (Markus, 1987), thus 
interrogating (1) the level at which a group action 
(network effect) is likely to begin, and (2) the 
difference in the interest of the participants. For 
example, for a network effect to occur, what is the 
minimal quantity of subscribed consumers on a social 
network, and how likely is it that some users will have 
more interest and thus invest more? 
The base value may take the form of a contribution 
from the platform operator—for example, Salesforce’s 
CRM software. In this case, the value would be a 
nearly static stock because the limited team of 
contributors and content only grows organically. Other 
base values depend on activities from ecosystem 
partners, such as Salesforce’s third-party service 
providers. If successfully implemented, these base 
values grow through the activated network effect 
beyond the static behavior restricted by one’s own 
resources and provide scalability otherwise 
unachievable through mere automation. 
The simplest form of a network effect is a direct effect 
where an increase in use leads to an increase in value 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1986). These effects are always 
same-sided. The telephone is a common example. 
Sterman (2000) shows that network effects can be 
strengthened or weakened by complementary network 
effects. Indirect network effects or market mediated 
effects may also manifest. They occur when the use of 
a good spawns complementary products or services 
that in turn increase the value of the original good 
(Economides & Salop, 1992). The iPhone is a good 
example of a valuable product that became more 
valuable because of complementary software services. 
Rochet and Tirole (2003) as well as Parker and Van 
Alstyne (2005) reveal that, in many cases where 
indirect network effects occur, two or more distinct 
participant groups benefit from each other. The 
increase in use by one group increases the value of a 
complementary good of another group and vice versa 
resulting in two- or multisided markets or platforms 
(Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006; Parker & 
Van Alstyne, 2005; Rysman, 2009). Two-sided 
markets may include various alternatives for causal 
loops. Those loops may be same-sided—for example, 
demand-sided or supply-sided. They may also be 
cross-sided, involving both sides of the platform. 
Eisenmann et al. (2008, 2011, 2006) speak of demand-
sided network effects, finding that platforms that are 
open to external supply can encompass cross-sided 
network effects. In these effects, the supply side and 
demand side are interdependent. 
Service platforms with consumers on the one side and 
service providers on the other comply with the 
definition of two-sided markets. The Salesforce 
service platform illustrates this cross-sided effect. 
With more consumers looking for offers, the 
attractiveness rises for third-party service providers to 
offer services. Salesforce complemented their same-
sided marketplace with the development and 
deployment environment enabling external services to 
create cross-sided network effects. The size of 
Salesforce’s consumer base had a direct effect on the 
suppliers’ motivation to offer their own services, and 
the increasing amount of services offered increased the 
service platform’s attractiveness to consumers. Further 
examples can be found in the relationship between 
hardware and software vendors, such as Microsoft and 
Intel (Wintel)5, as well as in the relationship between 
marketplaces and service providers (Barros & Dumas, 
2006). 
Hence, in our context, service network effects describe 
the reciprocal relationship between the value of a 
service platform and the quantity of involved service 
consumers and service providers. These network 
effects are driven by self-organization of the platform 
ecosystem based on participants’ autonomy, 
adaptability, and sensitivity to change (De Wolf & 
Holvoet, 2005; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977) because 
third-party participants are not under the full control of 
the platform operator. 
Consequently, (service) network effects themselves 
cannot be truly designed. Successful service platforms 
must be designed for network effects. Unsuccessful 
service platforms tend to not accomplish self-enforcing 
network effects (Van Alstyne et al., 2017). 
3.2 Control Theory 
Many studies that investigate control in the context of 
open technical platforms and the enabling cooperation 
of distinct supplier and user groups include network 
effects in their reasoning and conceptualizing (e.g., 
Boudreau, 2010; Hagiu & Lee, 2011; Katz & Shapiro, 
1986; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018; Schilling, 2009). 
In this context, control is considered from perspectives 
of power through technology ownership, technical 
evolution decisions, and distribution rights. Being in 
control includes the rights to appropriate value from a 
technology. 
Closer to the systems-theoretical consideration of 
causal loops is the theory of feedback loop control 
(Ashby, 1964; Conant & Ashby, 1970). It describes the 
concept of a (technical) system being regulated by a 
control device aligning a reference value with a fed- 
back system output (see Figure 1). 
 
5 http://www.intelalliance.com/microsoft/ (now defunct) 
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Figure 1. Feedback Controlled System 
Table 1. Modes and Methods of Control based on Kirsch (1997) 
Control mode Key characteristics Antecedent 
condition 
Example 
mechanism 
Group of 
method 
Control method 
Behavior 
(formal) 
• Rules and 
procedures 
articulated 
Behavior 
observability 
Development 
methodology, work 
assignments, rules 
and procedures 
Enforcement Prescriptive control, 
sanctional control 
• Rewards based on 
compliance with 
rules and procedures 
Incentive  
Outcome 
(formal) 
• Outcomes and goals 
articulated 
Outcome 
measurability 
Comparison of 
outcome with the 
expected level of 
performance and 
successive rewards 
Enforcement Restrictive control 
• Rewards based on 
producing outcome 
and goals 
Incentive Motivational control 
Self (informal)  • Individual sanctions 
him- or herself 
None Individual 
empowerment, self-
management and 
self-monitoring, and 
self-rewarding with 
respect to self-set 
goals 
Enforcement  
• Individual defines 
task goals or 
procedures, 
Individual monitors 
and rewards her or- 
himself; the rewards 
are based in parts on 
individuals’ self-
control skills 
Incentive Informative control, 
market regulative 
control 
Community 
(informal) 
• Identification and 
reinforcement of 
acceptable behaviors 
None Coalitions of 
individuals with 
share ideologies, 
socialization, hiring 
and training 
practices, 
implemented rituals 
and ceremonies 
Enforcement  
• Common values and 
beliefs and problem-
solving philosophy 
Incentive Market regulative 
control, informative 
control, motivational 
control 
Transferred to our context of service platforms, control 
describes service management actions of the platform 
operator that change a set of parameters from the 
current status to a target status. Control in a platform 
context operates as a closed loop that uses feedback 
monitoring in the context of a regulatory process. The 
devices and methods, which are used to control such a 
process, can be attributed to different control modes. 
Building on these insights, Kirsch (1997) developed a 
taxonomy of control modes. We have associated six 
abstract control methods with these four control 
modes. They can be either enforcing or incentivizing. 
The set of Kirsch’s formal control modes contains (1) 
behavior control, characterized through articulated 
rules and procedures, and (2) outcome control, defined 
by expressed project outcomes and goals. Formal 
control modes can be designed to be observable and 
are hence suitable in enforcement and reward-oriented 
approaches (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1997; Ouchi, 
1979). Informal modes include (3) self-control and (4) 
clan control. Instead of clans, we use the term 
community, as this term is established in the service 
platform context. Self-control relies fully on an 
individual’s ability and competence for self-control. 
Control
Device
System
Feedback Loop
System 
Output
Reference
Value
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Community control modes are suitable where 
coalitions of individuals cluster around common 
values and beliefs (Kirsch, 1997). Informal modes lack 
observability and, hence, their successful 
implementation is difficult to observe. However, an 
organization can benefit from such interpersonal 
feedback-seeking dynamics in social structures that 
support the self-regulation of social processes 
(Ashford & Tsui, 1991). Table 1 summarizes Kirsch’s 
four control modes, their key characteristics, 
antecedent conditions, as well as examples of 
individual control mechanisms. Building on this, we 
introduce six control methods for service platforms. 
We categorize the enforcing methods as prescriptive 
control, sanctional control, or restrictive control. 
Similarly, we categorize the incentivizing control 
methods as market regulative control, informative 
control, or motivational control. We develop these 
control methods further in the following section, as 
their discussion requires further constructs we have not 
yet introduced. Each method can make use of multiple 
mechanisms 
4 Artifact Description 
In this section, we present the principles of form and 
function incorporating the underlying constructs with 
the aim of developing an ISDT for a design method. 
For the sake of readability, we have not separated the 
description of these two principles. First, we introduce 
our fundamental assumptions: actors and process 
elements allow for the description, modeling, and 
analysis of causal loops and thus service network 
effects. Second, we introduce structural elements to 
embrace different areas of staged platform authority. 
Finally, we introduce control methods to support the 
implementation of service management. For all of the 
above, we formulate design principles as explicit 
prescriptions on how to improve service platform 
design for network effects. Each of the design 
principles is accompanied by design rationale 
argumentation explaining the reason and justification 
as well as alternatives and trade-offs considered (Lee, 
1997). A tabular overview of the design rationale is 
available in Appendix B. The boundary condition for 
each design principle is “… given that it shall be used 
to design service platforms for network effects.” 
4.1 Constructs for Actors and Processes 
as well as their Form and Function 
Following our argument from the previous section, we 
build our conceptualization of actor and process 
constructs on system dynamics theory (De Wolf & 
Holvoet, 2004; Forrester, 1961; Nicolis & Prigogine, 
1977) and introduce the constructs participants, 
participant groups, activities, influences, transactions, 
and causal loops. 
The construct participant describes specific entities with 
respect to the service platform inside and outside its 
ecosystem. From a system dynamics point of view, 
participants are sources of small stock, perceived to be 
static in capacity and accumulation (Forrester, 1961). A 
group of specific entities of a large but finite size is 
called a participant group. The construct of a participant 
can be equally applied for consumers and suppliers 
(such as third-party software vendors like Zynga) or 
internal actors such as development teams. For the sake 
of simplicity and since participants can have multiple 
roles, we have not introduced multiple constructs for 
consumers, suppliers, etc. In a trade-off, we chose to 
distinguish groups of participants from individuals to 
highlight their importance in terms of capacity in causal 
loops. 
Design Principle 1: Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize all specific and 
unspecific participants and participant groups 
relevant to the service platform for users to 
distinguish all sources that can have transactions 
with activities on the service platform or that can be 
influenced by or influence other participants or 
participant groups. 
Activities correspond to stocks in system dynamics 
(Forrester, 1961). They can accumulate and deplete. 
Activities are any IT-enabled tasks of the platform 
operator (e.g., registration on a website, an app store, 
streaming music). They represent the location for the 
interaction of participants or participant groups with the 
service platform. They are the target of participants or 
participant groups addressed through transactions. 
Outgoing transactions to participants and other activities 
describe workflows. Any accumulation within an 
activity is considered an increase in value. Value 
denotes positive effects on the performance of actions, 
objects, and tasks. For example, the quantity of movies 
available on a video streaming platform may have value 
for service consumers. Likewise, the more participants 
subscribed, for example, to a social media network, the 
more the stock activity accumulates and vice versa. 
Design Principle 2: Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize all activities on the 
service platform for users to distinguish all stocks 
that can have transactions with other activities or 
participants or can influence participants. 
Transactions are value flows (Forrester, 1961; 
Sterman, 2000). Participants, participant groups, and 
activities can be the source of a transaction. Value 
flows coming from the ecosystem participant can only 
target activities, as those are the only constructs inside 
the service platform that exhibit stock characteristics. 
Transactions may be purchases of services or data 
exchange such as registrations on a service platform. 
Influences stimulate ecosystem participants or 
ecosystem participant groups to choose specific value 
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flows into the service platform. From a system 
dynamics perspective, influences are auxiliary 
variables that control the rate of flow of transactions 
through the stimulus of their sources (Forrester, 1961; 
Sterman, 2000). Influences therefore exclusively 
address participants or participant groups, that is, 
members of the platform ecosystem. Examples for 
influences include price change notifications, reviews, 
competitor offerings, or changes in group behavior 
(bandwagon effect). 
Design Principle 3: Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize influences and 
transactions on the service platform and the 
platform ecosystem for users to categorize 
interactions between participants, participant 
groups, and activities, respectively. 
If we had considered both flows and auxiliary variables 
as the mere input and output of participants and 
activities, then we would have only considered their 
interactions as one construct rather than separate 
transactions and influences. This would have resulted 
in a simpler structure of the model, yet it would have 
reduced the options to place controls in a differentiated 
manner. 
Further, we contemplated introducing causal loops as 
a distinct construct. Yet causal loops that incite 
network effects consist of a concatenation of the above 
constructs and therefore are not constructs of their own 
(De Wolf & Holvoet, 2004; Nicolis & Prigogine, 
1977). Introducing them as their own construct would 
simulate independence from the existing 
circumstances, which is not accurate. We assume that 
any perceived gain in guidance would be thwarted by 
dependencies with other constructs. 
Design Principle 4: Provide the method with a 
technique to design causal loops on the service 
platform and the platform ecosystem for users to 
make explicit possible network effects involving 
participants, participant groups, and activities. 
Figure 2 gives a schematic overview of the discussion 
thus far. It will be referenced again to explain further 
constructs. Participants with no relationship to the 
service platform cannot be the source of transactions. 
Nevertheless, as the origin of an endogenous variable, 
these participants must be able to influence ecosystem 
participants (Figure 2, a). If a participant is an ecosystem 
participant, the participant may have a defined 
relationship with the service platform and may thus be 
the source of a transaction (Figure 2, b), for example, as 
a customer subscribing (Activity 1) to the service 
platform. The participant may also be influenced by 
other ecosystem participants as a sink of an endogenous 
variable (Figure 2, c).  
 
 
Figure 2. Simplified Stock and Flow Diagram (Norta, Hendrix & Grefen, 2006)  
with Adapted Terminology in the Context of Structural Allocation 
(d)
(f)
(e)
(c)
(b)
(a)
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Participants cannot influence activities or internal 
participants. From a design point of view, the platform 
operator should attempt to influence the external 
participant creating a causal loop. Otherwise, his or her 
influence on the ecosystem will not be controllable. An 
internal participant can be the origin of an auxiliary 
variable that stimulates a value flow into the service 
platform. For example, an internal department could 
provide an existing (considered static) stock of services 
for deployment into Activity 2 (Figure 2, d), for example, 
downloadable content for an entertainment or gaming 
services. This provisioning may serve as the base value. 
The influence pointing from the internal participant to 
the external participant (Figure 2, e) (e.g., blog posts) 
may stimulate a value flow to fill Activity 1 (i.e., 
subscriptions) as may the influence from Activity 2 
(Figure 2, f) (e.g., downloads). 
The design of causal loops, which is crucial to the 
success of service platforms, is inherently complex 
(Ondrus, Gannamaneni & Lyytinen, 2015). During our 
research project, we have gathered best-practice advice 
on how to design causal loops. However, since the design 
of a service platform is a situational and bespoke 
undertaking, a normative decomposition into further 
design principles is unfeasible. Consequently, the 
following should be taken as a recommendation only and 
not as a recipe. 
We have observed that after specifying all known 
participants and activities, the platform designer should 
attempt to connect participants in simple one-sided direct 
causal loops. For example, if no direct contact to 
customers is present, one should consider introducing 
activities that foster community behavior such as chats 
or forums. Only then should the platform designer 
attempt to connect participants in two-sided or 
multisided indirect causal loops. These can augment 
direct causal loops or create new causal loops. For 
example, the designer could influence suppliers through 
the growth of the user base, and, vice versa, influence 
participants through new service offerings. This can be 
especially helpful if it is not possible to engage certain 
participants in a direct one-sided causal loop. 
Since participants’ interests in the service platform differ, 
multiple causal loops may be necessary to incite the 
desired network effect. Hence, the most important 
participants should be involved in multiple causal loops. 
For example, a social network may provide multiple 
activities for participants to interact with each other (e.g., 
direct communication through messengers, indirect 
communication through wall posts, or situated 
communication through games). Service platforms 
without a properly placed base value are likely to be 
nonstarters and, thus, unsuccessful. Closed service 
platforms that rely only on their base value may 
eventually run out of stock. For example, Steam was 
introduced as an updating and anti-piracy facility for 
Valve’s own games. Its growth only started once further 
publishers made their games available on the service 
platform. 
Activities can also represent this base value to incite 
service network effects (Oliver et al., 1985). We found 
that, because of their limited scalability, activities 
including their own base values should point to a causal 
loop rather than be part of a causal loop. Similarly, 
participants represent bottlenecks within a causal loop 
because of their nearly static stock behavior. Such loops 
rather require participant groups who can fill the 
accumulating activities on a service platform. Appendix 
D and E present and illustrate two archetypical causal 
loop patterns representing one-sided direct network 
effects and two-sided indirect network effects as well as 
three design patterns for service platforms. 
4.2 Framing Constructs and their Form 
and Function: Areas of Staged 
Platform Authority 
Based on control theory and, specifically, the taxonomy 
of control mode theory, we use the term platform 
authority to refer to the platform operator’s ability to 
exert control (in any of the four modes) over the quality 
of offered services (Kirsch, 1997). However, different 
areas of staged authority exist for platform operators. 
These areas indicate that the provider has full, limited, or 
no authority over service consumers or service providers 
because of the ecosystem’s inherent ability to self-
organize (De Wolf & Holvoet, 2005; Nicolis & 
Prigogine, 1977). This can also be observed with 
different kinds of service intermediaries (Heinrich, Leist 
& Zellner, 2011; Legner, 2009; Scholten et al., 2009). 
We derive the following three areas based on these 
observations. 
In the control area, the platform operator has full 
platform authority. Activities are exclusive to the control 
area. From a technical point of view, this means that the 
platform operator has the capability to enforce its 
technical infrastructure on all technically enabled 
activities that take place on the service platform 
(Heinrich et al., 2011). Examples include service 
consumption and service provisioning by third-party 
service providers. From an organizational point of view, 
this means that the platform operator can exert full 
platform authority over workforce participants (e.g., 
internal teams or external entities working on an 
assignment). Hence, the control area is the area in which 
the platform operator can fully exert control over 
activities, internal participants, and internal and 
incoming transactions. Moreover, the platform operator 
uses the control area to exert influence over the 
ecosystem participants. For example, Amazon’s control 
area, with respect to their cloud offerings, encompasses 
all IT-enabled services surrounding Amazon Web 
Services and the responsible employees. It includes 
neither its customers (e.g., Netflix) nor its suppliers of 
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third-party services (e.g., Sophos) nor its competitors 
(e.g., Google, Deutsche Telekom). 
In large models, it may be necessary to structure 
elements of the control area, for example, by grouping 
participants and activities because they are building a set 
of solutions or because they are in the same physical 
location. In areas where service network effects apply, 
the platform operator must be aware that these 
environments require scaling. 
Design Principle 5: Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize a control area for users to 
distinguish the section in which the platform operator 
can exert full platform authority through 
enforcement. 
The influence area is the structural area of the ecosystem 
surrounding the control area. Ecosystem participants, 
who are in or may come into a value exchanging 
relationship with the service platform, are located in this 
area. The influence area does not allow for control 
through enforcement, as it is outside the reach of the 
platform operator’s platform authority. It is a self-
organizing system that features autonomy, adaptability, 
and sensitivity to change (De Wolf & Holvoet, 2005; 
Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). 
The influence area therefore requires indirectly operating 
methods of control that the platform operator exerts from 
his control area, so-called incentivizing methods. In the 
influence area, the ecosystem participants can also 
influence each other. Finally, they are subject to 
influences of entities external to the ecosystem (e.g., 
competitors). As an example, the influence area of the 
aforementioned Amazon Web Services would include 
their customers and suppliers as well as transactions with 
and influences on them, but it would not comprise 
Amazon’s internal activities or their competitors. 
Design Principle 6: Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize an influence area for 
users to distinguish the subsection of a platform 
ecosystem where the platform operator can only 
exert limited platform authority through incentives. 
The noise area is the structural area outside the 
platform’s ecosystem. In this area, the platform operator 
cannot exert any influence on participants. It 
accommodates competitors and participants uninterested 
in becoming customers. Participants in the noise area are 
neither in a relationship of value exchange with the 
service platform nor can they exert influence on the 
platform operator. However, they may influence the 
ecosystem participants of the service platform and may, 
thus, cause a backflow of value (e.g., the rise of 
Facebook led to a decrease in unique MySpace visitors). 
No value flow happens between the noise area and 
control area, as they have no direct relationship with each 
other. Neither can any construct in this area be the target 
of influences from any other area. As mentioned earlier, 
a common example of participants in the noise area are 
competitors. 
Design Principle 7: Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize a noise area for users to 
distinguish the subsection outside the platform 
ecosystem where the platform operator has no 
platform authority and no form of control. 
This distinction into three areas is in line with Legner 
(2009), who provides a rather functional, tripartite 
taxonomy consisting of (1) infomediaries, (2) e-hubs, 
and (3) e-markets to describe different levels of control 
and influence. Complementing this categorization with 
the concept of (d) integrators (Heinrich et al., 2011) 
allows us to exemplify these areas of staged platform 
authority (see Figure 3). The services, which are simply 
crawled by an infomediary such as IoT Directory that 
actively collects and provides information about product- 
service systems in the internet of things, lie outside its 
control or influence area (Figure 3, a). E-hubs such as the 
Open Bank Project do not have access to any data traffic 
while federating a service. They sell a standardized 
application programming interface and provide a free-of-
charge software development kit to financial technology 
manufacturers and link a large ecosystem of compliant 
SaaS providers to potential SaaS users. However, both 
consumer and service provider actively choose 
cooperation with the e-hub. Therefore, both are located 
in the influence area (Figure 3, b). E-markets such as 
Advorto for recruitment services or Stripe for online 
payments represent a supply concept with limited 
enforcing authority. E-markets can control all traffic 
between the client and the service provider, as it is routed 
through the control area (Figure 3, c). E-markets are 
common in the intermediation of physical services (e.g., 
Uber, Airbnb).  
Integrators such as the CRM vendors Salesforce and 
NetSuite are omniscient to all traffic coming from and 
going to the consumer. They have enforcing power over 
the service as it is deployed within their control area, i.e., 
on their servers. However, this omniscience and platform 
authority shrinks once the service is of a composite 
nature and uses services outside the service platform’s 
control area (Figure 3, d). The consumer is always placed 
in the influence area. 
The previously discussed, Figure 2 also depicts these 
three staged areas of platform authority and allows for an 
improved visualization of interaction options. It now 
becomes clear which of the participants can be 
influenced and which participants have or could have 
transactions with the service platform since those are 
located in the influence area. Not considering one of the 
three areas would remove the ability to distinguish 
controllable participants (internal) from noncontrollable 
participants (external/ ecosystem) or remove the ability 
to distinguish noninfluenceable (competitors) from 
influenceable participants (ecosystem). 
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Figure 3. Areas of Staged Platform Authority  
4.3 Constructs for Control Methods and 
Their Form and Function 
Control methods with their respective mechanisms 
allow platform operators to intervene in managing 
services and service consumption by managed self-
organization (Kirsch, 1997). Control methods can be 
used to steer causal loops surrounding the service 
platform (i.e., to generate and control network effects). 
Adding control methods to causal loops turns those 
loops into controlled feedback systems. However, 
since full platform authority is restricted to the control 
area, the positioning of control methods that point to 
exert service management is exclusive to this area. 
In the following, we detail all six control methods 
introduced in Section 4.1. We explain their 
applicability to the different constructs before 
formulating further design principles on how to 
employ them. The enforcing methods comprise 
prescriptive control, sanctional control, and restrictive 
control. 
An antecedent condition for prescriptive control is the 
observability of behavior (Kirsch, 1997). Platform 
operators can observe behavior of third-party activities 
and participants in the control area since they have 
submitted to their prescriptions. Having allocated the 
activities and participants within the control area, the 
platform operator can both observe and steer the 
activities of external participants and modify their 
outcomes (Ouchi, 1979). Hence, prescriptive control 
refers to the sequence of observing and steering a 
participant’s set of actions within activities. Within 
causal loops, prescriptive control channels the 
behavior of internal participants and activities such 
that they provide a maximum of value for the service 
network effects by abiding with rules set by the 
platform operator. For example, a platform operator 
such as Valve enforces certain software designs to 
facilitate enhanced observability with respect to 
service quality features such as cheat detection, 
transactions, etc., on its Steam platform. Prescriptive 
control may further include subsequent corrective 
actions by the platform operator through sanctional 
control. 
The platform operator can use sanctional control to 
either sanction deployed (third-party) services or 
subscribed participants through suitable activities. 
Sanctions are enforced in the moment of a policy 
breach (Henderson & Lee, 1992). The service platform 
gathers information on policy breaches (e.g., copyright 
infringement or SLA violations) by automatic 
verification, service support, or complaint 
management systems. After the discovery of such an 
infringement, an escalation routine is initiated. The 
escalation routine can vary from defined time for 
correction or statement requested from the participant 
to immediate un-deployments, depending on aspects of 
safety, security, or the importance of the policy breach. 
Within causal loops, sanctional control penalizes 
activities such that they return to a behavior that 
provides maximum value for the service network 
effects. In practice, sanctional control is typically 
active when operating a service platform. Salesforce, 
for example, has a two-staged escalation routine for 
infringed services. They proactively remove the 
service in question but may redeploy it upon request. 
Service
ServiceService
Control Area
Influence Area
Service(b)
(c)
(d)
Service(a)
Noise Area
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Only a court order or similar outside forces will lead to 
a final removal of the service.6 
Restrictive control is a formal control method. It acts 
as a filter on transactions within the control area and 
verifies compliance with platform policies (e.g., 
Transaction 4 in Figure 2). As the platform operator 
does not observe the generation of a value, restrictive 
control relies on outcome measurability as an 
antecedent condition (Henderson & Lee, 1992). Within 
causal loops, restrictive control confines inflows into 
the service platform and value flows on the service 
platform to those of value for the network effect. For 
example, if a consumer is not considered credit-
worthy, he or she will not be able to transact with 
certain activities on the service platform. The 
incentivizing control methods comprise market 
regulative control, informative control, and 
motivational control. 
Market regulative control categorizes influencing 
control methods that are fully driven by the ecosystem 
and generated through explicit feedback (Ouchi, 
1979). Market regulative control can address service 
consumers (e.g., through product rankings) as well as 
service providers (e.g., through recommendations). Its 
objective is to communicate information on service 
quality. This is a self-organizing process (De Wolf & 
Holvoet, 2005; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). The 
ecosystem self-organizes when, in reciprocity, 
consumers adapt their consumption behavior and 
service providers amend service quality. This 
represents a causal loop within the control area as well 
as into the ecosystem in the influence area. Hence, 
within causal loops, market regulative control provides 
a scalable means of independent and individualized 
quality management that goes beyond the ability of an 
internal business unit to improve the focus for value 
flows to incite service network effects. For example, 
collaborative feedback systems such as Google Play’s 
reviews enable participants to recommend or to advise 
against a value contribution provided by another 
participant and, thus, provide structure and highlight 
the content of their app market. Market regulative 
control is located exclusively at influences and 
activities within the control area. 
Informative control stimulates creativity in the 
ecosystem, targeting individuals or communities and 
providing them with preprocessed information (e.g., 
regarding service requirements, preferences, or 
feedback on a specific quality). It addresses the 
participants’ intrinsic motivation (Frey & Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997) and consequently highlights opportunities 
or invitations to participate in activities. In contrast to 
the contributions in market regulative control, which 
are community-based, the platform operator manages 
informative control and addresses existing or potential 
participants or participant groups. Within causal loops, 
the goal of informative control is to incite a self-
organizing process of alignment and retention in favor 
of the service platform. It addresses external 
participants (e.g., customers) through influences—for 
example, through notifications on content views, as 
Google Maps does after submitting reviews for 
locations.7 
Motivational control comprises methods that explicitly 
set incentives and potential rewards for participants. It 
works extrinsically (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
The platform operator can incentivize activities in the 
control area. Moreover, motivational control can affect 
influences on participants or participant groups in the 
ecosystem (e.g., to motivate participants financially to 
produce services that are of strategic relevance to the 
service platform in a certain segment). Within causal 
loops, motivational control communicates explicit 
benefits for participants, which is often helpful in the 
early stages of establishing a network effect. For 
example, Dropbox motivates subscribed participants to 
invite new participants by offering extra storage as a 
reward.8 Often programs such as these are discontinued 
when a sufficient number of users have subscribed. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the applicable control 
methods for each actor and process construct within the 
control area.
 
Table 2. Activities, Participants, Transactions, Influences, and their Respective Control Methods 
 
Enforcing methods Incentivizing methods 
Prescriptive 
control 
Sanctional 
control 
Restrictive 
control 
Market 
regulative 
control 
Informative 
control 
Motivational 
control 
Participant x      
Activity x x  x x x 
Transaction   x    
Influence    x x x 
 
6 https://www.salesforce.com/company/legal/ 
7 https://maps.google.com/localguides 
8 https://help.dropbox.com/accounts-billing/space-
storage/earn-space-referring-friends 
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Using these six control methods, the platform operator 
can structure its authority over participants and 
participant groups, activities, transactions, and 
influences to incite and harness service network effects 
on its service platform. Each conceptualized method 
needs to be activated to produce an effect. This results 
in four further design principles: 
Design Principle 8: Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate prescriptive control 
methods on internal participants who are in 
hierarchical subordination to the platform 
operator’s authority for users to monitor and steer 
their sets of actions. 
Design Principle 9: Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate all but restrictive 
control methods on activities for users to regulate 
their interactions by giving prescriptions, 
monitoring, and possibly intervening or 
incentivizing and influencing. 
Design Principle 10: Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate restrictive control 
methods on transactions for users to regulate the 
inflow (resp. outflow) into activities and thus 
ensure compliance. 
Design Principle 11: Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate incentivizing 
control methods on influences for users to regulate 
the feedback into the platform ecosystem. 
In terms of design rationale, we have defined one set 
of control methods per construct. For all four design 
principles, we have considered all control methods and 
only allow those that apply to the context of the 
respective construct. We have considered formulating 
six design principles as one per control method. Yet we 
found it more intuitive and better aligned with an ISDT 
for design methods to consider control methods in the 
service platform design based on preexisting actor and 
process constructs rather than independent thereof. For 
a more detailed discussion of the design decisions, also 
see Appendix B. 
Figure 2 also illustrates the application of three of the 
above four design principles through black dots: 
activated control methods on activities (Activities 1 
and 2), on transactions (b and d), and on influences (e 
and f). Appendix E provides three examples of best-
practice patterns for common features of service 
platforms, including the respective controls. 
Once more, we have gathered practical advice for the 
placement of control methods. Again, the following 
should be considered as a recommendation only and 
not as a “one-size-fits-all” prescription. Activities 
conceptualize a part of the service platform, where 
third-party applications can be executed on the service 
platform’s (virtual) infrastructure. Consequently, it is 
important to ensure that actions can be taken for 
security breaches, performance problems, or legal 
issues. Hence, the platform designer should consider 
using both enforcing methods on activities in order to 
sanction third-party behavior on the service platform 
that does not conform to prescriptions. 
As transactions represent value flows and can only 
flow into or within the control area, it is crucial to use 
restrictive methods to monitor and control the 
transactions entering the service platform, as the origin 
of the transaction cannot be observed and controlled. 
Transactions in the control area may not be as crucial. 
Influences are a group of stimuli on ecosystem 
participants. Attracting and retaining the right 
participants to the service platform with motivational 
control is often the most effective but also the costliest 
option. Hence, informational control and market 
regulative control can substitute (or support) activities 
and influences at later stages of platform development 
once the relevant data is available (e.g., download 
numbers or customer reviews). 
Finally, we found that it is important not to 
overregulate third-party behavior on the service 
platform. All controls should be conceptualized and 
placed as deemed necessary. Yet, one must carefully 
consider which controls to activate at the same time. 
This also suggests that it may be useful to design a 
roadmap of multiple stages of service platform 
evolution, implementing and controlling further causal 
loops as the service platform progresses. 
5 Expository Instantiation 
5.1 Instantiation as a Conceptual 
Modeling Language 
To facilitate the design process of a service platform, any 
development group must agree on some shared 
representational forms. Based on these, they can 
exchange and discuss ideas, thoughts, opinions, 
objectives, and beliefs about the object system 
(Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytinen, 1995) (e.g., about the 
design and parameters of a service platform). One suitable 
means of representation is considered to be conceptual 
modeling (Frank, 1999). 
In this section, we present a graphical modeling language 
derived from our ISDT for the design of service network 
effects to instantiate its design principles. It is a means of 
documentation, of support for analysis and design, and of 
facilitating communication. It is an early prototype, a 
proof of concept that makes our theory actionable by 
providing a notation for a design method to model 
network effects for a service platform. It shows that our 
ISDT can be employed to design a suitable design 
method. We have collected evidence supporting the 
artifact’s utility, quality, and efficacy through an initial 
assessment with two focus groups. 
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Figure 4. Screenshot of Cloud-Based Editor with a Sample Model 
We implemented the notation’s syntax and morphology 
through a stencil set, a plugged-in runtime constraint, and 
the layout processor within the Oryx framework (Decker, 
Overdick & Weske, 2008). The editor includes a shape 
repository, accommodating the language’s structural and 
procedural elements, a modeling canvas, and a property 
configuration panel, allowing for configuring the control 
methods. Figure 4 presents a screenshot of the editor with 
a sample model. We have documented all major elements 
of the language in Appendix C using the OMG Unified 
Modeling Language (Object Management Group Inc., 
2015) and the OMG Object Constraint Language (Object 
Management Group Inc., 2014). A full specification of the 
language can be found in Scholten (2013). 
The sample model displays the control area (box with 
black line), influence area (box with dashed line) as well 
as the noise area (shaded canvas). There are two activities 
(hexagon) and one participant (box with rounded edges) in 
the control area and one participant and one participant 
group (three stacked boxes with rounded edges) in the 
influence area. All value flows between the contructs are 
either labeled as an influence or as a transaction. 
Whenever multiple transactions or influences converge, 
we use a merging gateway (diamond with a plus) that 
symbolizes that all interactions lead to a single value flow. 
All controls are marked as white or black dots on 
participants, activities, influences, and transactions. Black 
dots signify activated controls and white dots signify 
control points with the possibility to enable control 
methods. The base value of the service platform is 
displayed as the symbol β with the Department for Own 
Value Contribution. This department now deploys 
services on the service platform, which serves as a base 
value. This influences the Target Group to subscribe. The 
more subscribers the service platform has and the more 
services the service platform has, the more the Target 
Group subscribes, that is, the stock is filled. This creates a 
causal loop, a direct demand-sided network effect. The 
amount of subscriptions eventually also has an influence 
on Partner 1 to start deploying services on the service 
platform. This activity eventually influences more 
participants of the Target Group to subscribe and so forth. 
This second causal loop is an indirect cross-sided network 
effect through service consumption and third-party supply. 
5.2 Exemplary Application: The Case of 
M-Engineering 
We have modeled a set of existing service platforms that 
were part of our initial explorative analysis. Service 
platforms comprised Salesforce, NetSuite, Dropbox, and 
Google+. This helped us explore the conceptual modeling 
language’s expressiveness (i.e., its capability to represent 
all relevant processes and control methods encountered in 
the real world in a semantically and syntactically correct 
way).  
In the following, we exemplarily present the results 
achieved with M-Engineering, a company offering 
surveillance, control, and data acquisition solutions 
(SCADA) in automated processes. The company offered 
on-premises solutions and is a new entrant into the service 
platform business. Figure 5 presents the model, 
developed by one of two key evaluation users, the 
company’s solution manager and platform architect. To 
start with, Design Principles 5 to 7 were automated using 
the software and placed the boundaries of the control area 
and influence area on the noise area as a modeling canvas 
according to the restrictions introduced above.  
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Figure 5. Model of the M-Engineering Service Platform 
Following Design Principle 1, M-Engineering decided 
to distinguish the internal participant M-Engineering 
Services as the operator of their key service. Relevant 
participants groups are manufacturing companies 
(customers) and external service providers. Some of 
the latter are addressed as an individual participant 
(External Partner 1 and 2) since they will receive 
individualized treatment by M-Engineering. They 
expect competitors to influence their service platform 
as well. External service providers were consciously 
placed in the influence area while competitors remain 
noninfluenceable in the noise area. Following Design 
Principle 2, the modelers centered their value 
proposition on the deployment of a cloud-based 
SCADA solution (modeled as an activity). Further 
activities include their native app WinCC Tracking, the 
use of SCADA services as well as the use of their just-
in-sequence supply-chain integration (use SCM 
services). 
Embracing Design Principles 3 and 4, the modelers 
have connected all participants and activities with 
transactions and influences to conceptualize flows of 
information and services as well as causal loops. The 
cloud-based SCADA solution is operated by M-
Engineering Services and is used by the WinCC 
Tracking native app (modeled as transactions).  
They expect this offer to influence and attract 
manufacturing companies to subscribe and use their 
services (modeled as a transaction) despite competitor 
influence. They saw the potential to design consumer-
sided network effects through the offer of SCM 
services. Transferring detailed process and quality data 
from one manufacturer in the chain becomes simple 
through the cloud-based aggregation of SCADA data. 
M-Engineering is aware that its customer-base it is too 
small to create strong network effects on the supply 
side. However, the consumption of services promises 
to influence specific hand-selected partners (External 
Partner 1 and 2) to provide additional services to 
support an emerging indirect two-sided network effect. 
Following Design Principles 8 to 11, M-Engineering 
chose not to control their internal participant. However, 
they chose to activate restrictive control methods on all 
transactions from the influence area. Furthermore, they 
modeled the inclusion of several control methods on 
activities and influences. For example, they chose to use 
market regulative control, where one provider can invite 
co-producers from the same supply chain. Additional 
free data storage for the inviting manufacturing 
company is part of this motivational control. Also, the 
offer of a free-of-charge service bottom line to the 
addressee is motivational control, reducing the 
addressee’s switching costs and representing a suitable 
way to attain critical mass with respect to network 
effects (Shapiro & Varian, 1998). 
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This application confirmed our assumption that the 
design method can be used to model existing service 
platforms to the extent necessary to visualize, analyze, 
and explain existing networks effects. It furthermore 
confirmed that our conclusion was not primarily based 
on our possibly biased perception of the design method 
but was also confirmed by selected platform operators. 
5.3 User Feedback 
To assess the effectiveness of our first stable 
configuration of the artifact, we conducted a user survey 
(Henderson et al. 1995). The survey is based on the two 
workshops with the aforementioned users from M-
Engineering as well as business professionals from an 
IT company with service platform products. The survey 
used their respective service platforms as a modeling 
case. We constructed the survey instrument based on 
existing questionnaires (Kitchenham & Pfleeger, 2002; 
Wittern & Zirpins, 2016) to measure how actionable our 
approach is in supporting the design of service platforms 
(see also Chandra et al., 2015). First, we modified the 
wording to fit the situation. Second, we developed some 
novel items relating to our design requirements. Each 
question was measured on a 5-point Likert scale, 
ranging from -2: strongly disagree to 2: strongly agree. 
The questions were answered by all ten participants of 
the two workshops. Table 3 includes an excerpt of the 
questions asked and their results. Appendix F contains 
the full questionnaire. 
As a result of this preliminary assessment, the modelers 
reaffirmed the usefulness of our expository 
instantiation. Moreover, the design method was found to 
be suitable for the design of service platforms (utility) 
and not only shortened the design time (efficacy) but 
also improved the understanding of the effects at work 
(quality). We received less favorable results for the 
current usability of the implementation. We assume that 
this is mainly because we limited ourselves to web-
based open source modeling frameworks and we have 
not yet focused on a wizard-like interface to guide the 
modelers but gave them full access to all constructs of 
the design method. 
The approach could be extended by following 
Tremblay, Hevner, and Berndt (2010), who suggest 
using confirmatory focus groups for the refinement of a 
proposed artifact and the evaluation of its utility. In this 
case, participants would be asked to use a traditional 
design method, and subsequently the proposed 
approach, and asses the usefulness. Their assessment 
method, however, would not offer evidence to judge 
individual design principles as it would also propose a 
summative appraisal of the design method. 
Table 3. Selected Scores from the Questionnaire (Excerpt) 
Question Aggregate score (n=10) 
The design time was shorter when using the software as compared to a design without the design 
method and software 
2 
I was quickly able to understand both design method and software 1.2 
The design method gives me a better understanding of network effects and control possibilities in 
platform ecosystems 
2 
The design method and the software helped me to produce a better solution than without them 2 
All relevant elements from the real-world scenario find application in the model representation 2 
The graphical user interface (GUI) was intuitive and easy to follow -0.6 
Average of all 45 questions asked 1.60 
6 Evaluation of Design Principles 
To specify our design principles, we drew from several 
underlying theories (see Section 3). We derived the 
design principles conceptually, deducing their 
necessity argumentatively from literature and 
experience and explained our rationale (see Section 4). 
To make our design principles actionable, we 
instantiated them in the form of a conceptual modeling 
language (see Section 5). While Gregor and Hevner 
(2013, p. 351) argue that “a proof-of-concept may be 
sufficient” when judging design science research 
contributions, we use this expository instantiation also 
in the design of an evaluation for our design principles 
to support textual description of service network 
effects with diagrams. 
However, the evaluation of digital platforms in design 
science studies presents methodological challenges 
because typical evaluation criteria for IS design such 
as user acceptance or system quality do not necessarily 
suffice for platforms. Furthermore, evaluation 
approaches for platforms are difficult to develop since 
platforms in and of themselves offer little value for end 
users without the services being provided by them (de 
Reuver et al., 2018). 
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We propose an ex post analysis that can either be 
naturalistic (focus group, survey) or artificial 
(laboratory experiment) to evaluate our design 
principles (Venable, Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2012; 
Venable, Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2016). Consistent 
with Venable et al. (2012), we have already argued a 
logical proof for the necessity of some design 
principles when discussing our design rationale. For 
example, we have argued that removing an area of 
staged platform authority would remove the ability to 
differentiate options for control or influence. A logical 
proof, however, does not shed light on the actual ability 
of our design principles to guide service platform 
designs for network effects. 
When describing his theory of action, Norman (1986, 
p. 55) states that it is “an important point to realize that 
approximate methods suffice” when trying to guide 
design construction and use of systems. At the 
beginning of a design project, a person forms a mental 
model and expresses his or her goals in these terms. 
The resulting system design has features expressed 
relative to its physical state. His theory describes the 
gulf of execution as the discrepancy between 
psychological and physical variables when creating a 
system design and the gulf of evaluation as the degree 
to which the artifact provides representations that can 
be directly perceived and interpreted in terms of the 
expectations and intentions of the user (Norman, 1986, 
1988). These gulfs are theoretical constructs we deem 
suitable for framing our evaluation. 
Consequently, the evaluation of our design principles 
is a triple-edged sword. On the one hand, we need to 
test if the design principles bridge the gulf of execution 
and indeed support the generative task of designing. 
On the other hand, we need to check whether the 
designs according to our design principles improve the 
understanding of service network effects by users and 
conform to their expectations and, thus, bridge the gulf 
of evaluation. Further, we must assess the perceived 
expressiveness of the design principles to understand 
if they seem to be complete to the user. In the 
following, we propose a survey to perform an artificial 
ex post evaluation. 
6.1 Survey Design 
Norman’s gulf of execution bridges several segments 
relevant to our evaluation: intention formation, 
specifying the action sequence, and executing the 
action. While the former two are mental actions 
relating to design principles and guidelines in terms of 
language and procedure, the latter is the physical 
action of creating a service platform design that can be 
observed and whose results can be analyzed. For 
analyzing the generative task of design, we borrow 
from Bowen, O’Farrell, and Rohde (2009) and Gassen, 
et al. (2016), who argue that complexity limits our 
ability to execute because of information overload on 
our limited working memory. Similar to Bowen et al.’s 
evaluation of query design, we propose evaluating 
whether following our design principles reduces 
inherent complexity when designing a service platform 
for network effects rather than increasing it. In doing 
so, we evaluate the specific modeling process as well 
as the result of that modeling process—that is, the 
conceptual model—rather than evaluating the 
metalayer by having subjects create a design method 
using our design principles. 
Proposition: Service platform descriptions and 
diagrams in a notation for a design method based 
on all of our design principles will better bridge the 
gulf of execution by reducing complexity than a 
subset or superset thereof. This will lead to: 
H1: Higher assessment scores in the qualitative 
assessment of the newly created model by model 
users. 
H2:  Greater satisfaction with and confidence in the 
resulting model by the model creator. 
H3:   Shorter or similar design time of the model. 
We consider the cognitive theory of multimedia 
learning (Mayer, 2005; Mayer, 2009) to be an 
appropriate foundation for the evaluation of 
understanding, bridging the gulf of evaluation. In the 
past, this theory has been used to evaluate data models, 
object models, and process models (Burton-Jones & 
Meso, 2006; Gemino & Wand 2005; Mendling, Reijers 
& Recker, 2010). The theory provides broad variables 
for the comprehension of audio or text and visual 
information when multimedia messages are organized 
into mental models in one’s working memory. It 
assumes that the human brain processes information in 
these dual channels, has a limited capacity (see also 
cognitive load theory, Sweller, 1988), and learns 
actively. We argue that the mechanisms at work can be 
used to evaluate the understanding of service network 
effects designed for by following our design principles. 
To judge the level of understanding, we apply Mayer’s 
(1989) model for understanding, which has been 
adapted to the IS domain by Recker, Reijers, and van 
de Wouw (2010): understanding can be measured 
based on the knowledge construction from learning 
material (i.e., the content), instructional method (i.e., 
the representation), and learner or user characteristics. 
While knowledge construction as a learning process 
cannot be directly observed (Gemino, 1999), 
understanding can be measured based on the 
knowledge a user acquires as a result of the learning 
process (Recker et al., 2010). 
We propose testing this across three measures of 
understanding (a search-recognition and inference test, 
a problem-solving test, and a “fill-in-the-blank” test). 
This leads to the following testable proposition and 
hypotheses: 
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Proposition: Service platform descriptions and 
diagrams in a notation for a design method based 
on all of our design principles will increase users’ 
understanding of the domain. This improved 
understanding will lead to: 
H4: Higher retention scores in search-recognition and 
inference questions about the case. 
H5: Higher transfer scores in problem-solving questions 
about the case. 
H6: Similar recall scores in a cloze test about the case. 
To assess the expressiveness of our design principles, 
we borrow from Recker et al.’s (2011) evaluation of 
modeling grammars. They base their work on the idea 
that the grammar of a modeling language determines 
the outcomes of the modeling processes (Wand & 
Weber, 1993). Similarly, we assume that the 
configuration of design principles determines the 
outcome of the design process. Hence, we state that our 
design principles should be free of principle deficit, 
principle redundancy, principle overload, and principle 
excess. That is, we do not miss principles to describe 
real-world phenomena, we do not provide more 
principles than required for a single phenomenon, we 
do not provide principles that can be used to describe 
more than one phenomenon, and we do not provide 
principles that are not relevant to describe phenomena. 
Henceforth, any other configuration of design 
principles should lead to lower scores. 
Proposition: A design method based on all of our 
design principles together will be regarded as more 
ontologically expressive than a design method 
based on a subset thereof. This will lead to: 
H7: Lower scores in principle deficiency, redundancy, 
overload, and excess. 
6.2 Survey Excerpt 
For the questionnaire, we propose describing the case 
using text as well as the aforementioned conceptual 
modeling language as an instructional method to 
devise an A/B test. Each design principle belongs to 
one of three categories: actors and processes, areas of 
staged platform authority, or control methods. To 
evaluate our design principles, we suggest removing 
one design principle from each of these groups for one 
of the two test cases: Case B neither contains a control 
area, nor does it differentiate between influences and 
transactions, nor does it allow for controls on internal 
participants. All participants should be provided with 
the relevant design principles and guidelines for their 
set. User characteristics have been considered in terms 
of the user’s experience with service platforms and 
their specification as text and model. 
To test for generative aspects of our design theory, we 
suggest asking participants to employ the modeling 
language based on our design principles and guidelines 
to design a service platform. We recommend using an 
open question about a specific type of a service 
platform generally known to the participants, such as: 
Please conceptualize a service platform for 
the distribution of online games using our 
design principles. Focus on a design that 
makes network effects more likely to appear 
and be controlled so that they support the 
business of the service platform. 
The aim of this task is to assess whether our design 
principles enable creating a meaningful design rather 
than seeking the correct solution to a question. By 
abstaining from a detailed textual description, we 
avoid spelling out the details of the service platform 
design since this would result in a transfer test rather 
than an assessment of generative aspects. We suggest 
taking the time to create a model to evaluate if using 
our design principles results in similar or better design 
times. Once the design is completed, we propose 
scoring the model using two independent reviewers 
and a 7-point Likert scale to evaluate how plausibly the 
service platform design is able to incite network effects 
and whether the model contains any defects. Further, 
participants should be asked if they are satisfied with 
this model and confident that it meets expectations: 
The model I created is an exact 
representation of my design goals. 
The model I created will meet the 
expectations of the model user. 
Additionally, we propose an evaluation of the user’s 
understanding by testing for retention (i.e., 
comprehension), transfer (i.e., the ability to use 
knowledge), and recall (i.e., the ability to retrieve 
knowledge). 
We employ the cross-sided indirect network effect 
pattern of Appendix D as an example scenario using 
Dropbox’s DBX service platform as a demonstration 
case. Participants would receive one diagram and case 
description, which they would keep for the duration of 
the retention and transfer test. These would be 
removed for the recall test. 
Retention should be measured by the participants’ 
number of correct answers to search-recognition and 
inference questions about the case. Each question 
would ask for a multiple-choice selection. The answer 
would be scored as correct or incorrect. The following 
is a sample question for search-recognition: “Is the 
Dropbox internal development currently actively 
controlled by the platform operator?” The following is 
a sample question for inference: “Does the deployment 
of services lead to more deployment of services?” 
Transfer performance should be measured by the 
participants’ number of acceptable answers to 
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problem-solving questions about the case. Each 
question would ask for a qualitative explanation. The 
answer would be scored as correct, borderline 
acceptable, or incorrect. The following is a sample 
question for transfer: “Assume another kind of third-
party partner: they would not add services to Dropbox 
but use Dropbox in their products to store files as a 
service. How could they be influenced to add Dropbox 
to more of their products? How much authority would 
the platform operator have over them?” 
Recall performance should be measured by the 
participant’s capability to complete the narrative of the 
case in a cloze test. Participants would be assessed by 
the number of blanks they filled with a correct word or 
synonym. The following is an sample extract from the 
recall test: “The case shows how Dropbox Business 
customers positively ______ other Dropbox Business 
customers as well as DBX service platform partners 
through the application of several ______ methods in 
the context of causal loops.” 
Toward the end of the questionnaire, the participants 
would be asked questions regarding the expressiveness 
of the design method, using a question about each 
design principle group. For example, concerning the 
omission of the control area, we propose asking: 
Have you ever had the need to distinguish 
concepts (such as participants) you can 
control from those you cannot? 
Does the design theory provide sufficient 
design principles to distinguish concepts 
you can control from those you cannot? 
Similarly, we propose asking questions about 
interactions and controls regarding principle 
deficiencies. We would then recommend using an 
analogous structure to test for redundancy and 
overload: 
I often have to choose between equal 
concepts to represent one kind of 
interaction on a service platform. 
I often have to provide additional 
information to clarify the context in which I 
want to use [transactions or influences / 
interactions] on a service platform. 
For those in Treatment group A, we added further 
questions regarding principle excess. For example: 
“Prescriptive control on participants does not have a 
real-world meaning on a service platform.” See 
Appendix G for a description of both scenarios and the 
full questionnaire. 
We assume that participants would need at least 60 
minutes to formulate meaningful answers and some 
prior experience with the subject domain. To improve 
validity, the survey has been reviewed by independent 
experts (academic and PhD level) for coherence and by 
students for understandability. Based on their feedback, 
we revised the cases and questions substantially for 
additional clarity. In particular, we chose a reasonably 
sized model, thus reducing the number of constructs to 
a manageable amount for a survey. 
Given his evaluation, we propose testing for the effect 
of what we believe are underspecified texts and models 
to show that our design principles improve the 
understanding of the domain for users and do not 
contain unnecessary or confusing elements. We 
acknowledge that we neither evaluate the superiority of 
the chosen visual representation over text or other 
notations nor do we gather information on potentially 
missing design principles in a structured way. Further, 
we acknowledge that this test does not shed light on the 
ability of our design principles to create a meaningful 
design method and/or modeling language and notation, 
but rather substantiates the ability and utility of one 
instantiation of our design theory to create new IT 
artifacts. In doing so, we consider conceptual models to 
be a suitable multimedia support for generating and 
understanding. However, we do not test for the 
effectiveness of different notations. In addition, 
structured surveys cannot cater to all types of user 
context factors. We seek to differentiate users based on 
novice/ expert and field dependence/ independence 
behaviors. In summary, the questions we ask focus on 
the omission of design principles. 
As regards a suitable sample for the evaluation, we 
propose collecting data from two populations: (1) IT 
architects and experts engaging in service platform 
design, and (2) students of information systems or 
computer science. This will also allow us to make 
comparisons with regard to domain knowledge and 
generalizability. 
7 Discussion 
7.1 Contributions 
Design science research seeks to develop prescriptive 
design knowledge through building and evaluating 
innovative IT artifacts that are intended to solve an 
identified class of problems (Hevner et al., 2004). Our 
core contribution in terms of this goal is an ISDT that 
offers explicit prescriptions and further principles of 
implementation for engineering a method to design 
service platforms for network effects using control 
methods. 
There are further artifact types in design research 
beyond methods (Offermann et al., 2010). While our 
ISDT provides prescriptions on how to design a 
method to build service platforms for network effects, 
some of the constructs and design principles may also 
apply to other artifact types. In particular, their essence 
can be used to analyze and improve system designs or 
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instantiations of service platforms for their use of 
network effects. 
As suggested by Gregor and Hevner (2013), we 
provide new knowledge in the form of a theory-
grounded ISDT using elven design principles. 
Methodically, we combine both improvement research 
and exaptation research (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). We 
propose a new solution to known problems—in our 
case, a new way of designing service platforms—and 
we apply known solutions extended to new problems, 
i.e., providing a theoretical rationale for harnessing 
network effects on service platforms, applying critical 
mass theory to service platforms, and using control 
methods to guide the resulting causal loops. 
Regarding improvement research, initial observations 
indicate that our ISDT for service network effects 
offers an improvement over current ad hoc 
development approaches because we explicate 
constructs (e.g., areas of staged platform authority) that 
are necessary to consider and address the problem of 
placing and balancing mechanisms for inciting 
network effects through control methods, which have 
not been explicitly and consistently considered in 
service platform design previously. The justification 
for our approach is grounded in the knowledge base— 
specifically, in system dynamics, network theory, and 
control theory as our kernel theories. We thereby 
deviate from and improve existing service platform 
development practice. We used our approach to map 
and analyze multiple real-world scenarios (see also 
Scholten et al., 2009) and provide evidence that this 
configuration of design principles is indeed useful. 
Similar to Chen (1976), providing the entity 
relationship model as a design method for Codd’s 
relational model (Codd, 1970), we propose 
instantiating the design method, our ISDT artifact, in 
the form of a conceptual modeling language capable of 
supporting any written specification with 
diagrammatic models. We agree with Gregor and 
Jones (2007) that building an expository instantiation 
and merely demonstrating that it works is not enough. 
It remains essential to include justificatory knowledge 
that provides an explanation of why it was constructed 
as it is and why it works, as well as testable 
propositions. Therefore, our results include not only an 
innovative instantiation but also knowledge about 
creating other instantiations that belong to the same 
class (e.g., other approaches building on the 
prescriptions of our ISDT to create methods to build 
service platforms) (Sein et al., 2011) and testable 
propositions for an empirical ex post evaluation. 
Our instantiation builds on the prescriptions of our 
ISDT. We show how the design of the instantiation and 
the use of specific components rests on the principles 
of these theories. This entails that practitioners have 
more, and deeper, knowledge to rely on when 
interpreting service platform designs or using our 
prescriptions as well as our guidelines in particular 
circumstances (Gregor & Jones, 2007). In sum, our 
design science research project makes a contribution to 
the knowledge base in the form of both the core artifact 
of an ISDT with corresponding design principles and 
guidelines (Level 3 contribution) as well as a situated 
instantiation of a conceptual modeling language (Level 
2 contribution) (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). 
7.2 Artifact Mutability 
Artifact mutability considers “changes in state of the 
artifact anticipated in the theory” (Gregor & Jones, 
2007, p. 322). It is concerned with the mutability of the 
output, the instantiation of the design theory. Similarly, 
while the Oryx-based implementation presented above 
is an instantiation based on our ISDT, the artifact 
whose mutability needs to be addressed is the 
conceptual model. 
This understanding of mutability is consistent with 
Gregor’s (2006) understanding of Codd’s (1970, 1982) 
presentation of mutability. He proposes views to 
counter the changes in the base tables (i.e., our 
models). He does not consider mutability of the 
relational model/ database management system itself. 
Hence, the ISDT, as well as its software-based 
instantiation, needs to be robust and continue to exhibit 
the traits ascribed to it in changing circumstances. Yet 
the artifacts produced, i.e., the models or service 
platforms, need to be flexible and adapt to change. 
Conceptual models are naturally mutable. They can be 
edited and updated at any stage by any actor with 
access to the software. Saving conceptual models does 
not render them ineditable with the editor (such as an 
export into an image format). Furthermore, versioning 
of the models allows for different variants of the 
models for different purposes to coexist (e.g., “as-is” 
vs. “to-be” models). Our decision to model causal 
loops as a concatenation of constructs further supports 
this, as the causal loops can be adapted over time rather 
than being replaced as a whole. Thus, if a new form of 
network effect is discovered, it is rather likely that our 
method can describe it in the design process of a 
service platform using our constructs. In addition, 
while the categorization of controls methods is 
extensible, we are confident that it is comprehensive 
enough to represent further methods of enforcement or 
incentive. 
The mutability of actual service platforms relies on 
software engineering principles and architecture 
paradigms. Workflow technology can enable 
flexibility in the adaptation of transactions and 
influences; object orientation and web service 
technology can enable flexibility concerning the 
adaptation of activities. 
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7.3 Limitations 
As mentioned earlier, our ISDT applies to any service 
platform design. It is a broad theory. Its merit is that it 
is applicable to multiple types of service platforms, 
ranging from social networks to mobile application 
distribution platforms. As a consequence of this 
breadth, our theory may lack precision in some 
domains. There may be factors that influence networks 
effects in one case but not in another. We do not cover 
these domain-specific factors. This is a limitation and 
a trade-off. In addition, our ISDT is not meant to be 
used to assess whether a service platform design is 
better or worse than another service platform design, 
or whether the inclusion of a particular causal loop is 
good or bad, or whether a certain base value will reach 
a critical mass. Our ISDT for service network effects 
may benefit from the inclusion of further domain-
specific variables when applied to a particular context. 
For example, factors from the 6C (Jaffe, 2010) could 
be used when trying to establish a community first 
rather than focusing on the speedy return of 
investment. 
We have presented testable propositions for our 
research based on the omission of design principles for 
actors and processes, areas of staged platform 
authority, and control methods. We hypothesize that 
their omission will reduce the generative aspects, 
understanding of the resulting service platform 
descriptions, and the ISDT’s expressiveness. We are 
aware that this evaluation is not all-embracing. It is 
however not feasible to test any combination of design 
principles with a suitable group of participants in 
sufficient numbers. Through the application of the 
theory in academia and practice, time will tell which 
configuration of design principles proves to be most 
beneficial. 
Even then, it is practically impossible to relate the 
design principles to the economic and financial success 
of a service platform a priori. As mentioned earlier, 
whether a service platform is successful in the market 
and reaches a critical mass also depends on additional, 
at times political factors that cannot be expressed 
through our ISDT. Moreover, our current transactions 
and influences represent a generic flow of value and do 
not attribute concrete valuations to allow for 
simulation or prediction. 
Furthermore, service platform design is rarely a 
greenfield activity. Hence, it is always necessary to 
answer to several issues that make the application of 
feedback theory as applied here in a sociotechnical 
context different from its rather technical application 
in system dynamics. For example, characteristics of 
the (eco)system might impose inherent limitations 
(e.g., jurisdiction on data privacy), inherent constraints 
and trade-off may exist (e.g., straightforward service 
implementation for the service provider vs. 
comprehensive control over the service’s capabilities 
by the platform operator), and there may be 
performance limits (e.g., bandwidth); these issues need 
to be quantified for meaningful design decisions 
(Chen, 2014). However, these are strategic business 
questions that our ISDT does not answer. 
We are aware of some limitations of the expository 
instantiation. First, the graphical modeling language is 
targeted at system architects and decision makers. 
Therefore, it is rather abstract and it is not possible to 
(semi)automatically derive any deployment 
architecture or even program code. So far, it is 
designed to be a means of communication to support 
the early stages of system design. Second, despite the 
language’s rather high level of abstraction, our 
evaluations so far have shown that not all language 
constructs are self-explanatory. In addition, the current 
implementation does not offer any form of automated 
guidance for the creation of new models. In some 
respect, the same limitations also apply to the 
understanding of models by users. In contrast to typical 
process models, there is no single point of entry, and 
models (i.e., the represented service platforms and 
their ecosystems) must be understood as a whole. 
Third, we have not yet performed a comprehensive 
side-by-side comparison with other service modeling 
languages. For example, Eisenmann et al. (2008, 2011, 
2006) do not consider technical service management. 
The open semantic service relationship (OSSR) 
approach (Cardoso, 2013) and the open semantic 
service networks (OSSN) approach (Cardoso, 
Pedrinaci & Leenheer, 2013; Cardoso et al., 2012) 
focus on graphical models of service networks in the 
context of service management. The service network 
notation (SNN) (Bitsaki et al., 2008; Bitsaki et al., 
2009), the service network modeling notation (SNMN) 
(Danylevych, Karastoyanova & Leymann, 2010), and 
e3* (e3value/e3services/e3controls) (Kartseva et al., 
2010) model service networks as a set of nodes and 
edges in a to-be approach. These notations consider 
explicit relationships of value exchange. Yet, none of 
them consider control methods nor the more implicit 
approaches of ecosystem influence as immanent in 
network effects. Because of shortcomings associated 
with our design principles, we have elected to create 
our own expository instantiation rather than modifying 
existing languages and dealing with the inevitable 
repercussions. Ultimately, their extendibility should 
also be explored. 
8 Conclusion 
The emergence of service platforms and their openness 
to contributions of third parties as well as to self-
organizing behavior on the consumer side, both give 
rise to new challenges for existing and future platform 
operators. The increased autonomy of suppliers and 
consumers and the network effects resulting from their 
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behavior increase the complexity of managing such 
service platforms. Platform operators are aware of the 
opportunities resulting from service network effects. 
However, challenges also arise because of the loss of 
influence on service quality, on the one hand, and the 
possibility of unachieved growth or rapid collapse of 
the consumer base because of negative network effects 
on the other. 
We have used, adapted, and structured existing 
knowledge originating from systems dynamics, 
network effect theory, and control theory and applied 
it to service platform design to find a balance between 
control and self-organization. We have used this to 
present an ISDT that provides prescriptive knowledge 
for design and action. It explains how the impact of 
platform authority is different depending on the level 
of control available to the platform operator. We have 
formulated eleven design principles to create a method 
that guides and improves the design of service 
platforms for network effects. They guide the 
development for causal loops and placement of control 
methods on participants, activities, influences, and 
transactions, and thus explain how service network 
effects work. Based on these insights, we have created 
a conceptual modeling language as an expository 
instantiation. 
For practitioners and researchers, this design method 
allows for the modeling and the identification of 
service network effects. It allows platform operators to 
conceptualize and manage the flows of service 
provisioning and consumption by fine-tuning their 
methods of platform authority. It enables researchers 
to hypothesize more comprehensively about the effects 
of causal loops and the effect of control methods. 
Consequently, the proposed method can act as a tool 
for supporting shared modeling, discussions, analyses, 
and decisions. 
Future research could focus on adding further modes 
than just control methods. Attributes with other foci 
and aspects might be useful (e.g., for monitoring or for 
security). At this stage, our instantiation provides a 
high-level view of interactions of service platforms 
and their ecosystems with the focus on harnessing 
service network effects and placing control methods. 
To be used in later stages of the systems development 
process, elements of the language also must be passed 
on to subordinate layers of modeling such as process 
modeling languages. 
In terms of generalizing the results for the broader 
topic of (composite) service engineering, a next step 
would be a comparison and evaluation in a controlled 
environment against other approaches such as OSSR, 
SNN, or SNMN, all of which do not consider either 
service management or ecosystem influence. As 
additional research builds on our foundation, formal 
comparison with alternative approaches in a variety of 
contexts becomes crucial to enable claims of 
generalizability (Hevner et al., 2004).
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Appendix A. Prior Research 
Prior steps in the research process consisted of the following activities: 
• Analysis of successful service platforms over a period of four years. We judged service platforms as 
“successful” according to two alternative criteria: First, if they were successful in terms of financial success 
in the service platform domain, substantiated through prior published investigations. Second, if they provided 
methods or structures that successfully support network effects (e.g., the service platform Trello applies 
specific structures and methods to achieve network effects in the case of small numbers of users). In particular, 
we considered Appirio, BOINC, Dropbox, Google, Facebook, Intensify, Intuit, LongJump, NetSuite, 
Salesforce, SAP, S.Chand Edutech, and Trello. With our choice of companies, we tried to include leading 
consumer service platforms, strong professional service platforms, and social clouds, as well as service 
platforms using public cloud applications. We also conducted several field studies with the platform operators 
CAS Software, SAP, S.Chand Edutech, and M-Engineering and evaluated the outcomes using self-control 
surveys of participants. The results progressively indicated that our conceptualization of network effect for 
service platforms matured. Several conceptualizations were discussed and later integrated or abandoned. 
Examples abandoned include indicators for positive or negative network effects and a quantifiable rather than 
binary base value. 
Design Science Iteration No. 1: First conceptualization of network effects on service platforms as a means to 
explain and analyze the effects. 
• Execution of a comparative longitudinal study. We analyzed service intermediaries, assessing and evaluating 
their methods, service quality, and service success (Scholten, Fischer & Zirpins, 2009). Specifically, the study 
compared the intermediary operators SeekDa, WebServiceList, Xmethods, RemoteMethods, eSigma, and 
StrikeIron Marketplace. This was extended by a longitudinal comparison of service quality for SeekDa and 
StrikeIron Marketplace. 
Design Science Iteration No. 2: Distinction of different configurations of service platforms using areas of 
authority. 
• Execution of field studies on three selected service platforms. We analyzed in detail the service platforms 
Force.com by Salesforce, SuiteApp by NetSuite, and Facebook Platform by Facebook. In the study design, 
we deployed self-developed sample services on the service platforms to gain a deeper insight into the control 
and release methods as well as on the service platforms’ configurations. We complemented the field studies’ 
findings with an analysis of the service platforms’ terms and conditions (Scholten et al., 2011). 
Design Science Iteration No. 3: Distinction of different modes of enforcing and incentivizing control as a 
means to steer network effect behavior. 
• Execution of field studies on the research service platform and e-market pilot “AGORA.” Within the AGORA 
project, we analyzed the value and effect of explicit and implicit feedback methods to improve service quality 
(May, Scholten & Fischer, 2011). The monitoring of experimental test consumer behavior allowed retrieving 
necessary feedback on consumer self-organization that was incited by feedback. 
Design Science Iteration No. 4: Intervention design and evaluation of selected feedback mechanisms. 
• Refinement and situated implementation. The critical discussion of an evolved solution led to a connection 
with the control modes suggested by Kirsch (1997), which we have described in a situated implementation of 
the artifact (Scholten, Schuster & Tai, 2012). We have also identified the underlying constructs as well as a 
method (Scholten, Janiesch & Rosenkranz, 2013) and proposed a comprehensive specification for a 
conceptual modeling language (Scholten, 2013). 
Design Science Iteration No 5: Refinement and consolidation of results toward a graphical design method; 
generalization toward an ISDT. 
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Appendix B. Detailed Design Rationale for Design Principles 
Table B1. Detailed Design Rationale for Design Principles to Design Service Platforms for Network Effects 
No. Design principle Construct Reason Justification Alternatives Trade-offs Decision 
1 Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize all 
specific and unspecific 
participants and participant 
groups relevant to the service 
platform for users to distinguish 
all sources that can have 
transactions with activities on 
the service platform or that can 
be influenced by or influence 
other participants or participant 
groups. 
Participant / 
participant 
groups 
Ability to 
distinguish 
sources with 
small and 
infinite 
capacity 
Any service platform 
will require sources to 
incite network effects 
(1) Consider 
only 
participants, (2) 
consider 
multiple 
participant 
(group) roles 
such as 
consumer, 
supplier, etc. 
(1) Simpler structures vs. loss 
of information regarding the 
ability to sustain network 
effects (as a group), (2) more 
guidance about available 
participant constructs vs. 
increased complexity and new 
issues, e.g. when a participant 
is a consumer and supplier at 
the same time 
Distinguish participants 
and participant groups 
2 Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize all 
activities on the service platform 
for users to distinguish all stocks 
that can have transactions with 
other activities or participants or 
can influence participants. 
Activities Ability to 
distinguish 
stocks that 
deplete and 
replenish 
Any service platform 
will require stocks to 
incite and maintain 
network effects 
None None Include activities 
3 Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize 
influences and transactions on 
the service platform and the 
platform ecosystem for users to 
distinguish interactions between 
participants, participant groups, 
and activities, respectively. 
Influences / 
transactions 
Ability to 
distinguish 
flows and 
auxiliary 
variables 
Any service platform 
will require flows to 
incite and maintain 
network effects, 
influence of auxiliary 
variables should not be 
neglected 
Consider flows 
and auxiliary 
variables as one 
kind of input or 
output of 
participants and 
activities 
Simpler structure vs. loss of 
information and less 
differentiated means to place 
control methods 
Distinguish flows as 
transactions from 
auxiliary variables as 
influences 
4 Provide the method with a 
technique to design causal loops 
on the service platform and the 
platform ecosystem for users to 
make explicit possible network 
effects involving participants, 
participant groups, and activities. 
n/a Ability to 
design causal 
loops 
consisting of 
the above 
constructs 
Causal loops are a 
concatenation of the 
above constructs. 
Hence, we did not 
introduce another 
construct 
Explicitly 
include direct 
and indirect one- 
and multisided 
causal loops 
More guidance vs. providing 
constructs that may not be 
necessary for all cases and 
hard to integrate with 
transactions and influences 
Causal loops are a design 
decision and should be 
built-on and constructed 
from the existing 
circumstances rather than 
being a construct of their 
own. Nevertheless, their 
design requires 
guidelines as it is a 
complex problem 
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5 Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize a 
control area for users to 
distinguish the section in which 
the platform operator can exert 
full platform authority through 
enforcement. 
Control area Ability to 
distinguish 
extent of full 
stakeholding 
power 
Demarcate the 
boundaries of the 
service platform, 
distinguish internal 
participants under full 
control from those 
under limited 
stakeholding power that 
can only be influenced 
Do not 
distinguish 
control area and 
influence area 
Lack of ability to distinguish 
internal participants from 
external participants and loss 
of clear demarcation of own 
platform boundaries (i.e., 
opportunities to exert full 
stakeholding power) 
Distinguish a control area 
from other areas of less 
or no control 
6 Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize an 
influence area for users to 
distinguish the subsection of a 
platform ecosystem where the 
platform operator can only exert 
limited platform authority 
through incentives. 
Influence area Ability to 
distinguish 
extent of 
limited 
stakeholding 
power due to 
self-
organization of 
ecosystem 
See DP5 (1) See DP5, (2) 
do not 
distinguish 
influence area 
and noise area 
(1) See DP5, (2) lack of 
ability to distinguish which 
participants can be influenced 
in the future even though they 
are not influenced today 
Distinguish an influence 
area from the control area 
and the noise area 
7 Provide the method with a 
technique to conceptualize a 
noise area for users to 
distinguish the subsection 
outside the platform ecosystem 
where the platform operator has 
no platform authority and no 
form of control. 
Noise area Ability to 
distinguish an 
area where the 
platform 
operator has no 
stakeholding 
power 
Necessity of an area 
where all other 
constructs can be 
displayed 
None, as the 
noise area is 
essentially the 
empty canvas of 
a drawing board 
None Consider the canvas as 
noise area 
8 Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate 
prescriptive control methods on 
internal participants, who are in 
hierarchical subordination to the 
platform operator’s authority for 
users to monitor and steer their 
sets of actions. 
Controls on 
participants 
Ability to 
prescribe 
behavior 
The platform operator 
needs to be able to 
instruct internal 
participants 
Include (1) 
additional or (2) 
fewer control 
methods 
(1) Does not apply since 
restrictive control is a filter to 
verify compliance with 
service platform provisions, 
this is true by definitions for 
activities of the platform 
operator, also sanctional 
control does not apply to 
internal participants but only 
to activities, the same holds 
true for incentivizing controls 
methods, (2) would negate the 
ability to use stakeholding 
power at all 
Apply prescriptive 
control methods to 
participants 
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9 Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate 
all but restrictive control 
methods on activities for users to 
regulate their interactions by 
giving prescriptions, monitoring, 
and possibly intervening or 
incentivizing and influencing. 
Controls on 
activities 
Ability to 
enforce and 
incentivize 
behavior on 
stocks 
The platform operator 
needs to take control of 
his stocks and harness 
them 
See DP8 (1) See DP8 on restrictive 
control, (2) would decrease 
the ability to differentiate 
controls methods 
Apply all but restrictive 
control methods to 
activities 
10 Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate 
restrictive control methods on 
transactions for users to regulate 
the inflow (resp. outflow) into 
activities and thus ensure 
compliance. 
Controls on 
transactions 
Ability to 
restrict flows 
The platform operator 
needs to have control 
over transactions on its 
service platform 
See DP8 (1) Sanctional and 
prescriptive control do not 
apply to transactions, the 
same holds true for 
incentivizing control methods 
(2) see DP8 
Apply restrictive control 
methods to transactions 
11 Provide the method with a 
technique to place and activate 
incentivizing control methods on 
influences for users to regulate 
the feedback into the platform 
ecosystem. 
Controls on 
influences 
Ability to 
actively 
incentivize 
behavior  
The platform operator 
needs to take control of 
auxiliary variables and 
harness them 
See DP8 (1) Enforcing control methods 
cannot be applied since the 
stakeholding power is limited 
to influences, (2) see DP9 
Apply all incentivizing 
control methods to 
influences 
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Appendix C. Metamodel and Language Concepts 
The language specification as presented here references the following normative, dated documents: OMG Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) for metamodeling (Object Management Group Inc., 2015) and the OMG Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) (Object Management Group Inc., 2014) for metamodeling. A full specification is available at 
Scholten (2013). 
Scope 
The conceptual modeling language focuses on essential aspects of the service platform design process. It provides a 
language and process support to platform architects and solution managers to model a service platform’s surrounding 
business ecosystem (e.g., service providers, consumers, competitors) and to model suitable structures and control 
methods to harness the service platform’s network effects. It further allows the evaluation of design alternatives. It 
explicitly includes the management of service provisioning and consumption. The scope is purely at the executive 
level and does not include board-related governance task such as corporate strategy formulation. 
Abstract Syntax (Metamodel) 
The abstract syntax gives a high-level definition of syntax, leaving out particularities to technical implementation, but 
it is precise enough to describe representation of and production rules for actual utterances (i.e., of graphical models). 
It builds on functional design specifications, derived from the design principles and guidelines discussed in Section 4. 
It complements those with specifications from theoretical design concepts as described in Section 3. 
The present work uses the UML as a metalanguage to display the abstract syntax’ assembly rules. Syntax needs to 
additionally prescribe the adaptation of graphic representation in function of specific conditions—for example, the 
case-dependent representation of the control points on nodes and edges. Therefore, OCL complements UML to 
prescribe adaptations of the graphical representation in design time and in function of the context-specific syntactical 
requirements.  
In the UML metamodel (Figure C1), classes give the metaview on the element nodes and edges, related and conjugated 
through production rules. The classes encapsulate characteristics, immanent to those elements as attributes. Some 
attributes define basic properties immanent to every element (i.e., identification number (id), name, and 
documentation). There are further attributes that are only carried by specific elements (i.e., base-value, controllable, 
controllableSource, controllableTarget, scalability, location, and provisions). An important property to a subset of 
nodes and edges in the context of service management is the control methods (i.e., prescriptive control, sanctional 
control, restrictive control, informative control, market-regulative control, and motivational control). The metamodel 
depicts the control methods not as properties but as classes. First, this expresses that the control methods belong to the 
control center ProtagonistControl in the metamodel. ProtagonistControl is a generalization to all control methods. 
Second, this approach emphasizes the fact that specific control methods can be aggregated by several elements. Third, 
it gives the language the possibility to mature over the next releases. The control methods are key. The isolated 
modeling allows language engineers to evolve them over time, for example, through specific new properties, 
dependencies, or association relationships (e.g., aggregations or compositions). For instance, a subsequent release of 
the specification could equip market-regulative control with the options reputation system and recommender system, 
potentially regulated through constraints, specified in OCL. Another option would be to add and update all emerging 
elements of recommender and reputation systems in the market to the modeling language. 
The present work begins class names with an upper-case letter and attributes with a smaller lower-case letter. OCL 
conditions under a class name describe conditions for a class instantiation. For example, Activity {{OCL} 
self.location = controlArea} describes that it is a necessary condition for an activity to be located within 
the control area. OCL conditions stated behind an attribute describe conditions when an attribute is applicable. For 
example, controllable: Boolean {{OCL} self.location = controlArea} defines that an element 
only carries this attribute if it is located within the control area. Table C1 details the metamodel and the language 
concepts.
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Figure C1. Metamodel 
[0..*]
[1..1]
location : Location
controllable : Boolean {{OCL} self.location = controlArea }
baseValue : Boolean {{OCL} self.location = controlArea }
AbstractNode
{abstract}
Id : integer
name : string
documentation : string
RootElement
{abstract} value : object
ExtensionAttribute
controllableSource : Boolean {{OCL} self.source.location = controlArea }
controllableTarget : Boolean {{OCL} self.target.location = controlArea }
AbstractEdge
{abstract}
[0..*] [0..*] [0..*]
controlArea
influenceArea
noiseArea
«enumeration»
Location
Gateway
{{OCL} self.location = influenceArea }
provisions : string
Transaction
{{OCL} self.target.location = controlArea; 
self.source.location -> excludes (noiseArea); 
self.source -> excludes (Gateway); 
(self.target = Participant) -> implies (self.source = Activity ) }
Influence
{{OCL} self.target.location = influenceArea; 
(self.source = Participant) -> implies (self.target = Gateway ) }
Participant
Participant Group
{{OCL} self.location -> forAll (participant | participant.location = self.location); 
self.location -> excludes (controlArea) }
[2..*]
provisions : string
Activity
{{OCL} self.location = controlArea }
ProtagonistControl
{{OCL} self.location = controlArea }
{abstract}
SanctionalControl
PrescriptiveControl
RestrictiveControl
MarketRegulativeControl
MotivationalControl
InformativeControl
[1..1] [0..*]
[1..1]
[0..*]
[1..1]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
has extensions
is extension to
relatedControlledElement {union}
source { subsets RelatedControlElement }
target { subsets RelatedControlElement }
[1..1]
[1..1]
[1..1]
[1..1]
[1..1]
[1..1]
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Table C1. Metamodel and Language Concepts 
Conceptual 
language aspect 
Linguistic action and statement 
(semantics and pragmatics) 
Metamodel component 
(syntax, cf. Figure C1) 
Notation element (representation 
symbol), concrete syntax 
Participant A participant is an individual or entity with small capacity (small stock or 
without stock behavior) within a control, influence, or noise area. 
Participants are considered static in the short-term view. They may not 
have any relationship at all with the service platform. However, in that 
case, they may want to influence those ecosystem participants who are or 
might be in a relationship with the service platform. A participant 
representing a group of ecosystem participants or internal participants may 
influence other ecosystem participants. Ecosystem participants may be the 
source of transactions into the service platform. A specific ecosystem 
participant may be in a transactional relationship with the service 
platform. Some workflows may flow from points of interaction to specific 
internal participants and then to an activity. An internal participant can be 
the origin of an endogenous variable, starting off a network effect.  
Participants are considered static in the short-term view. This does not rule 
out linear evolution (e.g., the entity service development hires new 
personnel and/or develops new services). 
Service platforms include the attribute base value. A base value is placed 
on and can be set true for participants within the control area. Base values 
of a platform ecosystem are those values that the modeler considers 
valuable enough to incite a network effect. Base values may vary during 
different modeling stages and depend on the goal to be accomplished. 
A participant further carries the attribute controllable if it is located in the 
control area. It is symbolized by a circle, depicted in the element’s 
representation. In that case, it can carry one or more control mechanisms 
of prescriptive control. The controllability of internal participants 
originates from their subordination to the platform operator. A participant 
within the control area can be internal entities such as departments or 
workgroups, but also external suppliers that work on contractual 
assignment. Details may be textually formulated or referred to in the form 
of a document identification number or hyperlink. A base value on a 
participant may be required to start a causal loop. 
 
 
Participant 1 (controllable, no control 
mechanism placed, base value activated) 
 
Participant 2 (controllable, one or more 
control mechanisms placed, no base value) 
 
Participant 3 (uncontrollable, therefore no 
option for base value) 
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Participant 
group 
A participant group is a group of individuals or of entities of finite large 
size within influence or noise areas. Participant groups may not have any 
relationship at all with the service platform. However, in that case, they 
may want to influence those ecosystem participants who are or might be 
in a relationship with the service platform. A participant group 
representing a group of ecosystem participants may influence other 
ecosystem participants and/or be in a transactional relationship with the 
service platform. Groups of ecosystem participants may be the source of 
transactions into the service platform. 
 
 
Participant group (uncontrollable, 
therefore no option for base value) 
Activity An activity is a variable stock, describing the magnitude and kind of 
interaction of participants and participant groups within the control area. 
Activities can represent a base value to incite network effects. They are 
points of interaction in the service platform that accumulate value. Value 
flows may exist from ecosystem participants and participant groups as 
well as from participants and activities to the service platform. An activity 
can be part of a causal loop, starting off a network effect. Positive 
modeling objectives means that only accumulating, but not depleting 
activities (stocks) of value are in the focus of the modelers’ interest. 
Activities (e.g., service development, service consumption, or service 
deployment) represent a stock that has accumulated in the past and which 
might increase, stagnate, or decrease in quantity in the future. Since, by 
definition, an activity can only take place in the control area, the symbol 
mandatorily carries the circle in the upper left corner, as it is always 
controllable. 
An activity can carry a finite number of control mechanisms of 
prescriptive control, sanctional control, informative control, and market 
regulative control. If one or more of them are activated, the circle is filled. 
Activities also carry the attribute provisions to describe or refer to 
applicable terms and conditions. This attribute however is not visible and 
requires a modeling environment with the option to visualize it in a 
configuration panel or drop-down menu. 
 
Activity 1 (no control mechanism, no base 
value) 
 
Activity 2 (one or more control 
mechanisms placed, base value activated) 
 
provisions : string
Activity
{{OCL} self.location = controlArea }
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Transaction A transaction describes a value flow into, within, or from the control area. 
Their source is either in the influence or in the control area. Transactions 
represent flows of value into points of interaction in the service platform 
as well as flows within the service platform. They have no interaction with 
participants or participant groups that have no relation to the service 
platform. Transactions from such external participants or participant 
groups exclusively flow into places of interaction. Cooperation with a 
participant takes place in those places of interaction. Transactions may 
describe workflows within a control area. Positive modeling objectives 
means only accumulating, but not depleting activities (stocks) of value are 
in the focus of the modelers’ interest. 
Transactions mandatorily carry the attribute of controllability, which 
becomes true if one or more restrictive control mechanisms are activated. 
Transactions also carry the attribute of provisions to describe or refer to 
applicable terms and conditions. This attribute, however, is not visible and 
requires a modeling environment with the option to visualize it in a 
configuration panel or drop-down menu. 
Transactions are displayed as arrows with a continuous line. The direction 
is indicated at the target side through a circle. A transaction must be 
depicted with a label “Transaction,” first letter capital, all other letters 
small. Similar to the controlled elements, a circle is placed at the target 
side on the symbol. 
 
Transaction without activated control 
mechanism and transaction with activated 
control mechanism 
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Influence An influence is a means to stimulate the rate of value flows at their 
sources. Influences impact ecosystem participants or participant groups 
through stimulation toward a changed value flow into the service platform 
(increased or reduced). One source can address several targets, and 
influences may be the aggregation of influences from several sources. The 
focus of consideration is the initiation of network effects. Causal loops 
without any activity or without any participant group included 
respectively cannot cause network effects. Influences between 
participants with sources in noise and influence are beyond the platform 
operator’s control. 
Influences carry a controllability attribute to show whether they can be 
controlled. The relevant Boolean status is defined by the location of the 
influences’ source. If the source of an influence is located in the control 
area, the controllability attribute is true and the element carries the circle 
depicting controllability. In such cases, the influence can carry a finite 
number of control mechanisms of motivational control, informative 
control, and market regulative control. If one or more of them are 
activated, the circle is filled. 
Influences are displayed as arrows with a continuous line. The direction is 
indicated at the target-side through a filled arrow head. An influence must 
be depicted by the label “Influence,” first letter capital, all other letters 
small. Similarly, to the controlled elements, a circle is placed at the source 
side of the edge whenever the attribute controllability is set to the value of 
“true.” 
 
An uncontrollable influence, a controllable 
Influence without activated control 
mechanism, and a controllable influence 
with activated control mechanism 
 
Gateway A gateway is a merging gate, consolidating the impact all incoming edges 
before triggering one or more outgoing edges. It operates on transactions 
and influences. 
 
The merging gateway symbol is also used 
in a similar fashion in process modeling. 
 
Control area 
Control area is the area where the platform operator can exert control over 
activities and internal participants, over all their own infrastructure and 
services, and over third-party service in the frame of contractually agreed 
legal frame set. It is also the area from which it influences ecosystem 
participants that are placed outside the control area. The control area needs 
to be modeled within the influence area.  
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Gateway
{{OCL} self.location = influenceArea }
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Influence area The influence area is the area where participants are located that are in or 
may come into value-exchanging relationship with the service platform. 
Ecosystem participants within this area may be influenced by the platform 
operator, but also by other participants within the ecosystem or outside. 
This area is out of scope for control activities. The influence area needs to 
be modeled within the noise area. 
 
 
 
Noise area The noise area embraces all areas outside the platform ecosystem. 
Whereas the platform operator cannot exert any stakeholding power, the 
participants in this area can influence the ecosystem participants in the 
influence area. No value flow happens between noise area and control 
area. 
The noise area does not have an explicit 
representation. The basic canvas of the 
modeling environment should be 
considered the noise area. 
Protagonist 
control 
Control points carry control mechanisms on participants, activities, 
transactions, and influences to manipulate their progression. Activities 
carry the enforcing mechanisms of prescriptive and sanctional control. 
They further accommodate market-regulative control, informative 
control, and motivational control. Participants may just carry prescriptive 
control; transactions are limited to restrictive control. Influences can work 
with market-regulative control, informative control, and motivational 
control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We model from a specific protagonist’s 
point of view. A complete model with 
participants, activities, and influences is 
interpreted as a control center for the 
protagonist. For the sake of clarity, we 
represent control mechanisms as 
aggregated control points, displayed only 
by a circle on specific instances of 
participants, activities, or influences. In an 
editor, configuration panels or drop-down 
menus display this as configurable 
attributes. 
Prescriptive 
control method 
Prescriptive control is the sequence of observing and steering a 
participant’s set of actions within activities as well as of internal 
participants. For actions in activities, it may further include subsequent 
corrective measures on their results through the platform operator. For 
example, the platform operator can limit freedom of service providers by 
prescribing specific development languages and tools or adherence to 
other standards. 
As such, prescriptive control is the mechanism used to control participants 
and activities inside a control area. Prescriptive control means that the 
platform operator can fully prescribe the steps to take in activities and 
participants on the service platform. Details and related provisions may be 
textually described or referred to in the form of a document identification 
number or hyperlink. 
controlArea
influenceArea
noiseArea
«enumeration»
Location
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Sanctional 
control method 
Sanctional control describes the enforcing action of the platform operator 
on policy breaches in activities. This happens through an escalation 
routine, including discovery processes, scope, and time of reaction for the 
participant, and range of enforcements through the platform operator. For 
example, the platform operator can specify potential restriction of service 
providers’ and services’ access to service platform functionality, 
termination of agreements, or any other necessary action in case of 
infringement. 
As such, sanctional control incites an escalation routine at any time an 
activity exhibits a certain level of incompliance with policy or regulations 
of the platform operator. Details and related provisions may be textually 
described or referred to in the form of a document identification number 
or hyperlink. 
*See Figure C2 at the bottom of table 
Restrictive 
control method 
Restrictive control is a filter mechanism on transactions placed within the 
control area and verifying compliance with service platform provisions. 
For example, when service providers supply a service to the service 
platform, then the service platform compares the service with the 
articulated provisions. In case of noncompliance, the service platform 
refuses access and potentially asks for amendment. 
As such, restrictive control is the mechanism to control inbound 
transactions from third parties (e.g., customers, suppliers). For example, 
restriction may be based on the compliance level of an inbound transaction 
to the service platform provisions. Details and related provisions may be 
textually described or referred to in the form of a document identification 
number or hyperlink. 
Market-
regulative 
control method 
Market regulative control is driven by participants. It gives explicit 
feedback to consumers or service providers in the service platform and/ or 
in the ecosystem on value, offered in activities or through participants. 
This incites a self-regulatory process. Optionally, it may provide a second 
layer sub-categorization into two types of collaborative feedback systems: 
recommender systems (collaborative sanctioning) and reputation systems 
(collaborative filtering). 
As such, market-regulative control uses feedback from consumers to exert 
control (i.e., through reputation and recommender systems). Details may 
be textually described or referred to in the form of a document 
identification number or hyperlink. 
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Informative 
control method 
In informative control, the platform operator preprocesses information and 
addresses it to existing or potential participants or participant groups. The 
analyses are customized on the addressed participants or participant 
groups and have the goal to incite a self-regulatory process among them. 
For example, potential customers can be intrinsically motivated through 
the available information on existing services. 
As such, informative control gives the suppliers (customized) information 
on consumer preferences, requirements, etc., and aims at supporting the 
platform operator toward an optimization of their services and eventually 
of the whole service portfolio. Details may be textually described or 
referred to in the form of a document identification number or hyperlink. 
Motivational 
control method 
Motivational control aims at steering ecosystem participants toward the 
accomplishment of specific outcomes through rewards. Motivational 
control can be triggered through monetary or nonmonetary rewards. For 
instance, an example of monetary rewards would be seed funding for 
specific participants. 
As such, motivational control groups all incentivizing activities toward 
participants within a control area. Details may be textually described or 
referred to in the form of a document identification number or hyperlink. 
*Figure C2
 
provisions : string
Transaction
{{OCL} self.target.location = controlArea; 
self.source.location -> excludes (noiseArea); 
self.source -> excludes (Gateway); 
(self.target = Participant) -> implies (self.source = Activity ) }
Influence
{{OCL} self.target.location = influenceArea; 
(self.source = Participant) -> implies (self.target = Gateway ) }
Participant
provisions : string
Activity
{{OCL} self.location = controlArea }
ProtagonistControl
{{OCL} self.location = controlArea }
{abstract}
SanctionalControl
PrescriptiveControl
RestrictiveControl
MarketRegulativeControl
MotivationalControl
InformativeControl
[1..1] [0..*]
[1..1]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[0..*]
[1..1]
[1..1]
[1..1]
[0..*]
[1..1]
[0..*]
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Appendix D. Causal Loop Design Patterns 
The design for causal loops is not as simple as using one construct such as putting competitors in the noise area but it 
requires the interplay of multiple constructs. In the following, we present two typical network effects patterns: a direct 
single-sided network effect similar to customers using the telephone and an indirect two-sided network effect typical 
for service platforms such as the one of M-Engineering, which considers the interdependency of customer and supplier 
behavior. 
Table D1. Direct Single-Sided Network Effect Pattern 
Pattern name Demand-sided direct network effect 
Intent This pattern provides a solution for network effects that shall be exploited to grow the consumer base. 
Applicability The solution can be applied in single-sided and multisided service platforms. The precondition is a 
deployment environment, scalable enough to cater to the potentially accomplished dynamic growth of service 
consumption through a demand-sided network effect. Applying it through collaborative scenarios created 
cases, requiring small critical masses, starting at a magnitude of two. 
Solution Members of a potential user group subscribe and consume services that were deployed by the platform 
operator. Regarding it as a dynamic system, the activity consume services has the function of a stock. The 
more subscribed users consume, the more this stock is filled. The activity deploy services also acts as stock. 
This activity represents the base value, which initially sets off the system (indicated by the β-symbol). The 
quantity of users can motivate—together with a quantity and quality of deployed services—new potential 
users to subscribe to the service platform. This motivation is weakened by competitive offers. 
The pattern channels explicit effort on positive user influence on the addressed population through the 
application of several control mechanisms in the context of a causal loop: On the influence, linking the 
consume activity and the gateway, platform operators apply informative and motivational control. 
Informative control amplifies the impact of the size of the user group. The nature of communicated 
information may vary. However, service platforms commonly communicate the subscribed number of users. 
Platform operators may use motivational control in various shapes. The transaction pointing from the user 
group to the subscribe activity applies restrictive control. That is, the user shall be required to accept the 
service platforms’ terms and conditions. Within the consume activity, the platform operator can exert 
sanctional control; that is, it may make use of its right and the power to exclude users. The deployment of 
services in the described pattern is an internal activity, therefore limited to prescriptive control and sanctional 
control. Exerting prescriptive control means to manage the deployment environment. Sanctional control 
stands for the power to un-deploy a service. The platform operator exerts prescriptive control on the 
participant internal service provision (e.g., in response to results from reputation systems) and may exert 
restrictive control on the transaction leading from internal service provision to deploy services. The influence, 
pointing from the deploy activity to the gateway includes the control mechanism of informative control. 
Informative control implies clear and targeted information on the product. The activity consumes needs to 
be placed in a scalable environment, to be able to respond to rapidly growing consumption. Strong growth 
behavior is realistic, as the activity is placed within a loop (demand-sided network effect). 
Diagram 
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Frequent 
features 
In many cases, the influence, pointing from the deploy activity to the gateway also includes motivational 
control and market regulative control. Market regulative control is applied through reputation mechanisms 
to reduce the entry barrier and to give decision support. 
The activity deploy services can be replenished by specific participants, representing the service development 
departments on the service platform. Linking edges are transactions. 
Consequences The pattern is reduced to the core features of a service deployment. It does not consider any complex feature, 
for example, replication or synchronization. Those need to be added in a contextualized approach. 
Examples Core business of social networks such as Facebook, Google+, Dropbox for consumers 
Table D2. Indirect Two-Sided Network Effect Pattern 
Pattern name Cross-sided indirect network effect through service consumption and third-party supply 
Intent This pattern provides a solution for network effects that shall be exploited to grow the user base and service 
base. 
Applicability The solution can be applied in multisided service platforms. The precondition is a deployment environment, 
scalable enough to cater to the potentially accomplished dynamic growth of service consumption through a 
demand-sided network effect and service deployment through supply-sided network effects.  
Solution Members of a potential user group subscribe and consume services that originate from the platform operator 
and service providers. Regarding it as a dynamic system, the activity consume has the function of a stock. 
The more subscribed users consume, the more this stock is replenished. The activity deploy services also 
acts as stock. This filled stock of services represents the base value, which initially sets off the system 
(indicated by the β-symbol). The quantity of users can motivate—together with a quantity and quality of 
deployed services—new potential users to subscribe to the service platform. This motivation is weakened by 
competitive offers. 
The pattern channels explicit effort on positive user influence toward the addressed population through the 
application of several control mechanisms in the context of a causal loop. 
Members of the targeted consumer group subscribe and consume services that were deployed by the platform 
operator. Regarding it as a dynamic system, the activity subscribed has the function of a stock. The more 
subscribed users consume, the more this stock is filled. The transaction pointing from the user group to the 
subscribe-activity applies restrictive control. That is, the user is required to agree to the service platform’s 
terms and conditions. Within the subscribed activity, the service platform shall exert sanctional control; that 
is, it may make use of its right and the power to exclude users. On the influence, linking the subscribed-
activity and the gateway, the service platform applies informative and motivational control. Informative 
control amplifies the impact of the size of the user group. The nature of communicated information may vary. 
However, service platforms commonly communicate the subscribed number of users. Platform operators 
may use motivational control in various shapes. The influence point from subscribed services to the target 
supplier group includes two control mechanisms: informative control and market regulative control. 
Deployed services are of internal and external origin. Services of internal origin are limited to prescriptive 
control and sanctional control. Exerting prescriptive control means to manage the services. Sanctional control 
stands for the power to un-deploy a service. The platform operator exerts prescriptive control within the 
participant internal service provision (e.g., in response to results from reputation systems) and may exert 
restrictive control on the transaction leading from internal service provision to deploy services. The influence, 
pointing from the deployed activity to the gateway includes the control mechanism of informative control. 
Informative control implies clear and targeted information about the services. 
The activities subscribed and deployed need to be placed in a scalable environment, to be able to respond to 
rapidly growing consumption. Strong growth behavior is realistic, as the activity is placed within a loop 
(demand-sided network effect). 
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Diagram 
 
Frequent 
features 
In many cases, the influence, pointing from the deploy services activity to the gateway also includes 
motivational control and market regulative control. Often, suggestions are used—for example, other users 
applying this service also applied XYZ. Market regulative control in this case stands for the use of reputation 
mechanisms to reduce the entry barrier and to give decision support. 
Consequences This pattern couples two causal loops and enforces a cross-sided network effect. Quality control functions 
need to be properly in place to harness positive effects but also to avoid the negative scenario of negatively 
accelerating loops, for example, initiated through the provision of low-quality third-party services. 
Examples Salesforce, NetSuite 
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Appendix E. Service Platform Design Patterns 
The design of or for any ability of a service platform requires the use of several design principles, combined with applying 
best-practice guidelines. As the design of service platforms typically is a bespoke activity, it is unreasonable to assume a 
finite list of patterns. As an illustration of best-practice knowledge, we present three core requirements for most service 
platforms: user subscription, service development, and service deployment. They illustrate the combined use of actors, 
processes, and controls to form causal loops. These patterns can be combined with those from Appendix D. 
Table E1. Service Platform Subscription Pattern 
Pattern Name Service platform subscription 
Intent This pattern provides a basic approach for managing subscription to a service platform. 
Applicability The solution is suitable for most service platforms. It helps onboarding and maintaining subscribers 
selectively. The subscribers can be service consumers, service providers, or both. 
Solution Members of an addressed user group subscribe and consume services. The transaction pointing from the 
addressed target group to the activity subscribe is equipped with restrictive control. That is, the user has to 
subscribe to the services and to accept the service platform’s service provisions (or a subset thereof). In the 
subscribed activity, the service platform exerts prescriptive control. The activity allocates a limited amount 
of freedom to consumers. Within the activity subscribed, the service platform also exerts sanctional control. 
That is, it retains the right and the power to exclude users. 
Diagram 
 
 
Frequent 
features 
The provisions in transaction and activity often include the following: contractual agreement (acceptance of 
service platform’s terms and conditions) and request for consumer details (address, payment details). 
Consequences The pattern is reduced to the core features of subscription. It excludes any application-specific feature, for 
example, geographical or market segment-specific distinctions due to national law or mentality. Those need 
to be added when applying the pattern. 
Examples Facebook, Salesforce, NetSuite 
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Table E2. External Service Deployment Pattern 
Pattern name Basic external service deployment pattern based on programming specification 
Intent This pattern provides an approach for managing third-party service deployment into a service platform. 
Applicability The solution is suitable for all service platforms. It helps onboarding and managing services. 
Solution Subscribed participants of a service provider group (participant target group) provide services for 
deployment on a service platform. Restrictive control on the transaction pointing from the activity 
subscribed to the activity deployed filters the infeed of services in the function of compliance with the 
service platform service provisions—that is, service design in compliance with the programming 
specification but also to legal requirements. The activity deployed includes sanctional control, which 
regularly verifies compliance with the service platform service provisions and initiates escalation routines. 
In addition, it includes prescriptive control to manage the deployed services. External services outside the 
control area requested from services deployed in the control area are subject to restrictive control, as their 
execution cannot be observed directly. 
Diagram 
 
Frequent 
features 
Some platform operators include a sandbox into the activity deployed to test a service before deploying. 
The inclusion of such a sandbox as a construct is useful if it is exploited in causal loops—for example, to 
attract early adopters in a testing phase. 
Consequences The programming specification limits the service providers’ scope of freedom with respect to reuse of 
services on other service platforms. Consequently, service providers could be tempted to produce simple 
requestors, programmed based on the programming specification, calling up external services. Many 
challenges with respect to service quality could migrate from an upfront filtering through restrictive control 
to an ongoing verification through sanctional control. 
Examples It corresponds to the approach chosen by Salesforce in their initial stage of expansion of the AppExchange/ 
Force.com service platform 
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Table E3. Service Development and Deployment Pattern 
Pattern name Service development with programming environment 
Intent This pattern provides an approach for managing third-party service development and deployment on a service 
platform. 
Applicability The solution is suitable for multisided service platforms. It helps with onboarding, testing, and maintaining 
services and service providers selectively. 
Solution Members of a target group provide services for deployment onto a service platform. A programming 
environment is prepended to the deployment environment, ensuring compliance with related service platform 
provisions. Apart from legal and administrative aspects, the programming environment on the activity 
developing ensures service manageability in the subsequent deployed activity through prescriptive control. 
The activity deployed also includes sanctional control, which regularly verifies compliance with the company 
policy and initiates escalation routines. Services, requested from outside the control area subject to restrictive 
control, as their execution cannot be observed directly. 
Diagram 
 
Frequent 
features 
Some platform operators include a sandbox into the activity deployed to test a service before deploying. 
The inclusion of such a sandbox as a construct is useful if it is exploited in causal loops, for example, to 
attract early adopters in a testing phase. 
Consequences The level of manageability is higher than in the case of a pure programming specification (see Table E2). 
Examples Prepended programming environments, for example, those used by Salesforce or NetSuite 
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Appendix F. User Feedback Questionnaire 
For the design of a user evaluation questionnaire, Kitchenham and Pfleeger (2002) suggested prepended research of 
comparable studies to build on past experience. As the design method and software are new artifacts, no previously 
acquired data are available. Hence, we reverted to the questionnaire design of Wittern and Zirpins (2016), who 
evaluated modeling and engineering tools for service composition. Their experience with assessing tools contributed 
to the questionnaire’s structure. 
This is an accepted methodology for software or design evaluation (Henderson et al., 1995). We note that this approach 
is not to be confused with the standards of quantitative survey research for behavioral studies. Because of the very 
limited sample size, a questionnaire-based survey for software or design evaluation can seldom reach the statistical 
power required in more behavioral research settings. 
Table F1. Full User Feedback Questionnaire 
Questions 
Please rate your experience with the software 
I found the features in the software purposeful to model platforms ecosystems and the respective network effects with the software 
The graphical user interface (GUI) was intuitive and easy to follow 
The GUI was sufficiently comfortable to work with 
The software did not restrict me in my modeling efforts 
When designing, I benefitted from the software’s guidance based on the design method’s grammar and its resulting content-
related suggestions and restrictions with respect to … 
… transactions and influences 
… controllable/ uncontrollable activities and participants 
… case-specific control mechanisms 
… areas (control, influence, noise) 
… getting a plausibility check of my modeling intentions 
Please rate your experience with the design method 
It was easy to understand the design method to model dynamic networks around service platforms 
The design method gives me a better understanding of network effects and control possibilities in platform ecosystems 
The design method helps to locate or create dynamic loops 
The design method helps to upgrade one-sided loops to two- or multisided loops, meaning to create interconnected loops to 
structures of two or more loops that directly impact on each other 
The context-specific suggestion of control mechanisms ... 
… always provides me with the most suitable control mechanisms 
… is unnecessarily limiting my scope of decision making 
… is difficult to grasp 
…. helps to design a service platform that influences growth of consumer and provider ecosystem 
…. helps to design a service platform that focuses on third-party services that fit into the corporate strategy 
…. allowed me to completely model my corporate platform 
The design method allowed me ... 
… to select the optimal nodes for placing base values 
… to evaluate whether our company already possesses strong base values 
… to evaluate whether we still need to create suitable base values 
… to see—in view of our base value situation—whether it makes sense to enter the platform business 
I was satisfied with the ordinal metrics for “Base Value” suggested by the design method 
The design method allowed me to think about scalability requirements per division 
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Please rate your perception on the achievable quality of the models designed with the design method and the software 
Correctness 
… I was able to produce one or more models where the structure and behavior of the models are consistent with the real world 
Relevance 
… All relevant elements from the real-world scenario find application in the model representation 
… All elements and relationships, applied in and required in the modeling language are relevant to accomplishing its design goal 
Economic efficiency 
… The model is robust, meaning it remains relevant over time, even when quantities of users, services, etc. evolve. 
… The model is adaptable, meaning it can be adapted without big effort to a modified constellation (e.g. to implement strategic 
change or to respond to environmental change). 
Clarity 
… The produced model was clear, understandable, and not overloaded 
Comparability 
… When modeling design alternatives on the same business case, I can compare them as they follow the same grammar. 
Systematic design 
… The system description from the Analyzer (Analysis view) and the Modeler are consistent 
General perception 
The design method and the software helped me to produce a better solution than without them 
The design-time was shorter when using the software as compared to a design without the design method and software 
I was quickly able to understand both design method and software 
The concept of control area, influence area and noise area … 
… allowed me to better position my modeling elements 
… supported my understanding of the authority for service management I have, depending on my design decision 
The concept of divisions helped me to better structure my model 
The concept of division groups helped me to model repeated areas of similar behavior 
The following elements helped me to express the interplay of relationships within a service platform … 
… activity 
… participant 
… participant group 
… transaction 
… influence 
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Appendix G. Evaluation Case Descriptions and Survey 
During the survey, the participants would have access to the case description relevant to their task and to a notation 
sheet (i.e., a simplified version of Table C.1) at all times except for during the cloze test. The expressiveness test does 
not require a case description either. Depending on the technical background of the participants, it may be useful to 
start with a training exercise to explain network effects and the design method. 
Introduction to Network Effects for Students 
A network effect is the (positive) effect that an additional user of a good or service has on the value of that product to 
others. When a network effect is present, the value of a product or service increases according to the number of others 
using it. 
The classic example is the telephone. A greater number of users increases the value to each user. Even though 
connecting a new telephone user does not intend to create value for others, it does so by joining the network. Service 
platforms such as online social networks work similarly, with sites Facebook and LinkedIn increasing in value to each 
member as more users join. 
Network effects can create a so-called bandwagon effect once a threshold, the critical mass, has been reached. This 
suggests that more users want to join the network creating a causal loop. The effect does not have to be same-sided 
(customer to customer) but can also be cross-sided, meaning that the value for other sides increases as well. For 
example, more users in the AppStore make the store more valuable for developers. Conversely, more developed apps 
make the store more valuable for users. 
Pre-test Questions: Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Have you ever used text to document a service platform? 
[Yes or No] 
2. Have you ever used a diagram to document a service platform? 
[Yes or No] 
3. Overall, how familiar are you with the methods to document a service platform. 
[1=not at all familiar ------ 7=Very familiar] 
4. Estimate how INTENSIVELY you have worked with relevant methods in the last 4 (four) years. 
[1=not at all intensive ------ 7=Very intensive] 
5. Estimate the level of COMPETENCE that you have attained in using methods for service platform documentation. 
[1=not at all competent ------ 7=Very competent] 
6. Estimate the level of CONFIDENCE that you have attained in understanding service platform documentation. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
Generative Case: Case A/B 
Please conceptualize a service platform for the distribution of online games using our design method. Focus on a design 
that makes network effects more likely to appear and control so that they support the business of the service platform. 
(Note that in this case, we asked for a service platform for online games. The type of the service platform should be 
chosen based on the participant’s knowledge about a domain since participants need to construct a model based on 
their own mental models without specific instructions.) 
Generative Assessment:  Case A/B 
Thank you for completing the task. Now, we have some questions about your recent modeling experience. Please 
answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. The model I created is an exact representation of my design goals. 
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[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
2. The model I created will meet the expectations of the model user. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
Furthermore, we have recorded the time it took you to model the case. In addition, two experts will score the model 
based on the following two questions: 
3. The model is plausible and its design for network effects supports the incitement and management of the 
aforementioned effects through causal loops and controls. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
4. The model is free of defects. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
(If the opinions of the two experts deviate, the model will be discussed and a joint assessment will be made.) 
Understanding Case A 
This is an example of direct and indirect network effects based on Dropbox’s DBX Platform for business users. The 
DBX Platform provides third-party business services on top of the regular Dropbox storage service, for example, data 
loss prevention services or document management lifecycle support. 
The case shows how Dropbox Business customers positively influence other Dropbox Business customers as well as 
DBX Platform partners through the application of several control methods in the context of causal loops. 
Potential Dropbox Business customers subscribe and consume services that were deployed by Dropbox internal 
development and third-party service providers (henceforth, DBX Platform partners). The quantity of customers can 
motivate—together with a quantity and quality of deployed services—new potential customers and DBX Platform 
partners in the influence area to subscribe to the DBX Platform. This motivation is weakened by competitive offers of 
other SaaS storage providers in the noise area. 
The transactions pointing from the customers and partners to the subscribe activities in the control area apply restrictive 
control. That is, customers and partners are required to agree to the service platform’s terms and conditions. Within 
each subscribe activity, the service platform exerts sanctional control. That is, it may make use of its right and the 
power to exclude customers as well as partners. On the influence, linking the subscribe activity and the gateway, 
Dropbox applies informative and motivational control. For instance, this could be communication about the amount 
of subscribed customers or an offer to invite new customers. The influence pointing from the subscribe activity to the 
DBX Platform partners also includes two control mechanisms: informative control and market regulative control. 
Deployed services are of internal and external origin. External services may be developed and later deployed by 
subscribed DBX Platform partners. The DBX Platform can exert prescriptive control means to manage the activities, 
e.g. API requirements, as well as sanctional control, e.g., to un-deploy a service. The DBX Platform also exerts 
prescriptive control on the Dropbox internal development (e.g., in response to results from reputation systems) and 
may exert restrictive control on the transaction between activities within the control area. The influence, pointing from 
the deploy activity to the gateway includes the control mechanism of informative control. It implies clear and targeted 
information about the services. Furthermore, the DBX Platform purchases required services from external services 
providers to run the service platform. These service providers are not influenced by the amount of deployed services 
or subscribed customers. 
The following figure provides a diagrammatic overview using the notation introduced in the main test: 
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Figure G1. Case A 
Understanding Case B 
This is an example of direct and indirect network effects based on Dropbox’s DBX Platform for business users. The 
DBX Platform provides third-party business services on top of the regular Dropbox storage service, for example, data 
loss prevention services or document management lifecycle support. The case shows how Dropbox Business customers 
positively affect other Dropbox Business customers as well as DBX Platform partners through the application of 
several control methods in the context of causal loops. 
Potential Dropbox Business customers subscribe and consume services that were deployed by Dropbox internal 
development and third-party service providers (henceforth, DBX Platform partners). The quantity of customers can 
motivate—together with a quantity and quality of deployed services—new potential customers and DBX Platform 
partners in the influence area to subscribe to the DBX Platform. This motivation is weakened by competitive offers of 
other SaaS storage provider in the noise area. 
The interactions pointing from the customers and partners to the respective subscribe activities apply restrictive control. 
That is, the customer or partner is required to agree to the service platform’s terms and conditions. Within each 
subscribe activity, the service platform exerts sanctional control. That is, it may make use of its right and the power to 
exclude customers as well as partners. On the interaction, linking the subscribe activity and the gateway, Dropbox 
applies informative and motivational control. For instance, this could be communication about the amount of 
subscribed customers or an offer to invite new customers. The interaction pointing from the subscribe activity to the 
DBX Platform partners also includes two control mechanisms: informative control and market regulative control. 
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Deployed services are of internal and external origin. External services may be developed and later deployed by 
subscribed DBX Platform partners. The DBX Platform can exert prescriptive control means to manage the activities, 
e.g. API requirements, as well as sanctional control, e.g., to un-deploy a service. The DBX Platform may exert 
restrictive control on the interactions between activities. The interaction, pointing from the deploy activity to the 
gateway includes the control mechanism of informative control. It implies clear and targeted information about the 
services. Furthermore, the DBX Platform purchases required services from external services providers to run the 
service platform. These service providers are not affected by the amount of deployed services or subscribed customers. 
The following figure provides a diagrammatic overview using the notation introduced in the main text: 
 
Figure G2. Case B 
Retention Questions: Initial – Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Over how many activities does the platform operator have control? 
[0 ------ 5, unknown] 
2. How many participants can the platform operator influence? 
[0 ------ 5, unknown] 
3. How many participants can the platform operator control? 
[0 ------ 5, unknown] 
4. Does the documentation depict a service platform that enables third-party services? 
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[Yes or No or Unknown] 
Retention Questions:  Search/Recognition – Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Is the Dropbox internal development currently actively controlled by the platform operator? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
2. Are the Dropbox Business customers controlled directly by the platform operator? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
3. Are the competitors controlled or influenced directly by the platform operator? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
4. Does Dropbox internal development deploy services? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
5. Do the DBX Platform partners deploy services? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
6. Does the competition influence the deployment of services? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
7. Is a control placed on the deployed activity? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
8. Is a control placed on the interaction of the consume and subscribe activity toward the gateway leading to the 
customers? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
9. Is a control placed on the interaction of customers with the subscribed activity? 
[Yes or No or Unknown]  
Retention Questions: Inference – Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Could Dropbox internal development theoretically be controlled by the platform operator? 
[Yes or No or Unknown] 
2. Could the provider of DBX Platform Required Services theoretically be controlled by the platform operator and its 
services? 
[Yes or No or Unknown] 
3. Does the deployment of services lead to more deployment of services? 
[Yes or No or Unknown] 
4. Do Dropbox Business customers influence the subscribe activity connected to DBX Platform partners? 
[Yes or No or Unknown] 
5. Could the DBX Platform customers be controlled by the platform operator? 
[Yes or No or Unknown] 
6. Can the combined effect of the interaction of deploy and subscribe activities be controlled by the platform operator? 
[Yes or No or Unknown] 
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Transfer Questions: Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Does the platform operator have the same level of authority over all participants? Please explain. 
[Text Field] 
2. How can the platform operator gain more control over competitors? 
[Text Field] 
3. How can you incentivize the customers to have more interaction (subscribe and consume) with the service platform? 
[Text Field] 
4. How can you remove the influence of competitors on your service platform? 
[Text Field] 
5. What are the necessary antecedents so that Dropbox internal development can be prescriptively controlled by the 
platform operator? What has to change (if at all)? 
[Text Field] 
6. Assume another kind of third-party partner. They would not add services to Dropbox but would use Dropbox in 
their products to store files as a service. How could they be influenced to add Dropbox to more of their products? How 
much authority would the platform operator have over them? 
[Text Field] 
Recall Questions (Cloze Test): Case A 
Please fill in the blanks: 
This is an example of [direct and indirect] network effects based on Dropbox’s DBX Platform for business users. The 
DBX Platform provides third-party business services on top of the regular Dropbox storage service, for example, data 
loss prevention services or document management lifecycle support. 
The case shows how Dropbox Business customers positively [influence] other Dropbox Business customers as well as 
DBX Platform partners through the application of several [control] methods in the context of causal loops. 
Potential Dropbox Business customers [subscribe and consume] services that were [deployed] by Dropbox internal 
development and third-party service providers (henceforth, DBX Platform partners). The quantity of customers can 
[motivate]—together with a quantity and quality of deployed services—new potential customers and DBX Platform 
partners in the [influence] area to subscribe to the DBX Platform. This [motivation] is weakened by competitive offers 
of other SaaS storage provider in the noise area. 
The transactions pointing from the customers and partners to the subscribe activities in the control area apply 
[restrictive] control. That is, the customer and partners are required to agree to the service platform’s terms and 
conditions. Within each subscribe activity, the service platform exerts [sanctional] control. That is, it may make use 
of its right and the power to exclude customers as well as partners. On the [influence], linking the subscribe activity 
and the gateway, Dropbox applies [informative] and [motivational] control. For instance, this could be communication 
about the amount of subscribed customers or an offer to invite new customers. The [influence] pointing from the 
subscribe activity to the DBX Platform partners also includes two control mechanisms: [informative] control and 
[market regulative] control. 
Deployed services are of internal and external origin. External services may be developed and later deployed by 
subscribed DBX Platform partners. The DBX Platform can exert prescriptive control means to manage the activities, 
e.g. API requirements, as well as sanctional control, e.g. to [undeploy] a service. The DBX Platform also exerts 
[prescriptive] control on the Dropbox internal development (e.g., in response to results from reputation systems) and 
may exert [restrictive] control on the transaction between activities within the [control] area. The influence, pointing 
from the deploy activity to the gateway includes the control mechanism of [informative] control. It implies the clear 
and [targeted] information about the services. Furthermore, the DBX Platform purchases required services from 
external services providers to run the service platform. These service providers are not [influenced] by the amount of 
deployed services or subscribed customers. 
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Recall Questions (Cloze Test): Case B 
Please fill in the blanks. 
This is an example of [direct and indirect] network effects based on Dropbox’s DBX Platform for business users. The 
DBX Platform provides third-party business services on top of the regular Dropbox storage service, for example, data 
loss prevention services or document management lifecycle support. 
The case shows how Dropbox Business customers positively [affect] other Dropbox Business customers as well as 
DBX Platform partners through the application of several [control] methods in the context of causal loops. 
Potential Dropbox Business customers [subscribe and consume] services that were [deployed] by Dropbox internal 
development and third-party service providers (henceforth, DBX Platform partners). The quantity of customers can 
[motivate]—together with a quantity and quality of deployed services—new potential customers and DBX Platform 
partners in the [influence] area to subscribe to the DBX Platform. This [motivation] is weakened by competitive offers 
of other SaaS storage provider in the noise area. 
The interactions pointing from the customers and partners to the respective subscribe activities apply [restrictive] 
control. That is, the customer or partner is required to agree to the service platform’s terms and conditions. Within 
each subscribe activity, the service platform exerts [sanctional] control. That is, it may make use of its right and the 
power to exclude customers as well as partners. On the [interaction], linking the subscribe activity and the gateway, 
Dropbox applies [informative] and [motivational] control. For instance, this could be communication about the amount 
of subscribed customers or an offer to invite new customers. The [interaction] pointing from the subscribe activity to 
the DBX Platform partners also includes two control mechanisms: [informative] control and [market regulative] 
control. 
Deployed services are of internal and external origin. External services may be developed and later deployed by 
subscribed DBX Platform partners. The DBX Platform can exert [prescriptive] control means to manage the activities, 
e.g. API requirements, as well as [sanctional] control, e.g. to [undeploy] a service. The DBX Platform may exert 
[restrictive] control on the interactions between activities. The interaction, pointing from the deploy activity to the 
gateway includes the control mechanism of [informative] control. It implies the clear and [targeted] information about 
the services. 
Furthermore, the DBX Platform purchases required services from external services providers to run the service 
platform. These service providers are not [affected] by the amount of deployed services or subscribed customers. 
Expressiveness: Principle Deficiency – Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Have you ever had the need to distinguish concepts (such as participants) you can control from those you cannot 
(e.g., internal teams vs. partners)? 
[Yes or No] 
2. Does the design method provides sufficient means to distinguish concepts you can control from those you cannot? 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
3. Our design method could be made more complete by distinguishing participants you can control from those you 
cannot. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
4. I cannot use the design method adequately to distinguish participants you can control from those you cannot. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
5. Have you ever had the need to distinguish interactions with participants in transactions and influences? 
[Yes or No] 
6. Does the design method provide sufficient means to distinguish interactions with participants in transactions and 
influences? 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
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7. Our design method could be made more complete by distinguishing interactions with participants in transactions 
and influences. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
8. I cannot use the design method adequately to distinguish interactions with participants in transactions and influences. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
9. Have you ever had the need to prescribe rules for an internal participant of the platform operator (e.g., escalation 
routines for a call center agent)? 
[Yes or No] 
10. Does the design method provide sufficient means to prescribe rules for an internal participant of the platform 
operator? 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
11. Our design method could be made more complete by adding the ability to prescribe rules for an internal participant 
of the platform operator. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
12. I cannot use the design method adequately to prescribe rules for an internal participant of the platform operator. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
Expressiveness: Principle Redundancy – Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Have you ever had the need to represent staged areas of platform authority? 
[Yes or No] 
2. I often have to choose between means to represent one kind of authority requirement. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
3. The design method often provides two or more means that can be used to represent the same kind of authority on a 
service platform. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
4. Using the design method, one kind of platform authority can often be represented by different means. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
5. Have you ever had the need to represent interactions? 
[Yes or No] 
6. I often have to choose between equal concepts to represent one kind of interaction on a service platform. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
7. The design method often provides two or more concepts that can be used to represent the same kind of interaction 
on a service platform. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
8. Using the design method, one kind of interaction can often be represented by different concepts. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
9. Have you ever had the need to prescribe rules for an internal participant of the platform operator (e.g., escalation 
routines for a call center agent)? 
[Yes or No] 
10. Does the design method provide sufficient means to prescribe rules for an internal participant of the platform 
operator? 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1458 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
11. Our design method could be made more complete by adding the ability to prescribe rules for an internal participant 
of the platform operator. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
12. I cannot use the design method to adequately prescribe rules for an internal participant of the platform operator. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
Expressiveness: Principle Overload – Case A/B 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Have you ever used an influence area for a service platform? 
[Yes or No] 
2. I often have to provide additional information to clarify the context in which I want to use the influence area on a 
service platform. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
3. Influence areas can have more than one meaning. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
4. I often use influence areas to represent more than one type of real-world phenomena. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
5. Have you ever used [transactions and influences / interactions] on a service platform? 
[Yes or No] 
6. I often have to provide additional information to clarify the context in which I want to use [transactions and 
influences / interactions] on a service platform. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
7. [Transactions and influences / Interactions] can have more than one meaning. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
8. I often use [transactions and influences / interactions] to represent more than one type of real-world phenomena. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
[Comment: Since no control is merged as in the other two groups, it is not possible to test for an overload of controls 
with this survey in a comparable manner.] 
Expressiveness: Principle Excess – Case A only 
Please answer each question as precisely as possible; if you are unsure, please make an estimate. 
1. Have you ever used the control area for a service platform? 
[Yes or No] 
2. The control area does not have a real-world meaning for a service platform. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
3. I often cannot precisely ascribe a real-world meaning to a control area. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
4. A control area does not represent any relevant real-world phenomenon. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
5. Have you ever used a transaction in a service platform design? 
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[Yes or No] 
6. The transaction does not have a real-world meaning for a service platform. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
7. I often cannot precisely ascribe a real-world meaning to a transaction. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
8. A transaction does not represent any relevant real-world phenomenon. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
9. Have you ever used prescriptive control on a participant? 
[Yes or No] 
10. Prescriptive control on a participant does not have a real-world meaning. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
11. I often cannot precisely ascribe a real-world meaning to prescriptive control on a participant. 
1[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
12. Prescriptive control on a participant does not represent any relevant real-world phenomenon. 
[1=not at all confident ------ 7=Very confident] 
Final Questions 
Rate the level of helpfulness of the diagram to understand the written text. 
[1=superfluous ------ 7=would not have worked without] 
Rate the level of helpfulness of the diagram to answer the questions. 
[1=superfluous ------ 7=would not have worked without] 
Would you have liked to see more information included in the text/ diagrams? If so, what would that be? 
[Text Field] 
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